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THE PERILOUS AND EVER-CHANGING
PROCEDURAL RULES OF PURSUING AN ERISA
CLAIMS CASE
Kathryn J. Kennedy*

1. INTRODUCTION TO ERISA'S UNIQUE CIVIL PROCEDURE
RULES
Because millions of employees and self-employed individuals are covered
under private and voluntary employee benefit plans today, filing to receive
benefits covered under such plans has become commonplace. However, the
acceptance of benefit requests, especially for health benefits, is anything but
commonplace. Due to the high cost of maintenance of health benefits, it has
actually become commonplace to see certain health benefits denied to claimants
on various theories, e.g., medical necessity, investigatory/experimental
exclusions, and other analogous cost-containment provisions. Once a claimant is
faced with a benefits denial under a plan, the exercise of the claimant's
substantive rights is contingent upon numerous civil procedure rules under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA").' These rules are in a
constant state of flux and development at both the judicial and regulatory levels.
Congress has attempted unsuccessfully over recent years to strengthen
claimants' substantive and procedural rights to health benefits, including those
under ERISA plans.2 Such legislative efforts have been coined the "patients' bill
*Assistant Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School; J.D., Northwestern University School
of Law, 1981. Special thanks to my research assistants Dave Rutter and Christopher Condeluci for
their excellent assistance.
1 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974)
(codified and amended in various sections of title 26 and 29 of the U.S.C.). ERISA is the federal
labor law which, together with section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code, I.R.C. § 401 (2001),
regulates the adoption and maintenance of voluntary employer-sponsored retirement and welfare
plans. ERISA's provisions were codified in title 29 of the United States Code, whereas the related
tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code were codified in title 26 of the United States Code.
The Department of Labor (hereinafter referred to as the "DOL") has authority under part 5 of title I
of ERISA to administer and regulate its civil enforcement provisions and claims procedure
provisions. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132, 1133 (2001).
See Bipartisan Patient Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 2563, 107th Cong. (2001); Bipartisan Patient
Protection Act of 2001, S.1052, 107th Cong. (2001); Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 1999, S.326,
106th Cong. (1999); Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act of 1999, S.300 IS, 106th Cong. (1999);
Quality Care for the Uninsured Act of 1999, H.R. 2990 IH, 106th Cong. (1999) (amended and
renamed as Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act, H.R. 2990 EAS, 106th Cong. (1999)); Bipartisan
Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999, H.R. 2723 IH, 106th Cong. (1999); Patients'
Bill of Rights Plus Act of 1999, S.1344, 106th Cong. (1999) (incorporated into Patients' Bill of
Rights Plus Act of 1999, H.R. 2990 EAS, 106th Cong. (1999)); Patients' Bill of Rights Act of
1999, S.240, 106th Cong. (1999); Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 1999, H.R. 358, 106th Cong.
(1999); Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 1998, S.2529 PCS, 105th Cong. (1998); Patients' Bill of
Rights Act of 1998, H.R. 3605 IH, 105th Cong. (1998); Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 1998, S.
1890 (1998); Patient Access to Responsible Care Act of 1997, H.R. 1415, 105th Cong. (1997).
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of rights." A presidential advisory commission under President Clinton made
specific recommendations concerning the expansion of consumer protections in
the health care industry, including substantive and procedural rights under
ERISA. 3 In late 1997, President Clinton urged Congress to implement the
Commission's recommendations, and, in reaction to weakened legislative efforts,
directed federal regulatory agencies to initiate administrative actions consistent
with the Commission's recommendations.4 As a result, the DOL made sweeping
proposed changes in 1998 to ERISA's claims procedure regulations,
implementing a number of the Commission's recommendations. 5 These DOL
proposals put aside the initial claim procedure regulations that were promulgated
in 19776 and made substantial regulatory changes, including attempts to repeal a
number of judicially formulated doctrines used for years in the litigation of
ERISA claims. 7 Despite the unsuccessful attempts of the Clinton administration
to legislate changes under ERISA, the DOL proposed regulations became final in
the latter days of the Clinton administration, with some modification and a
delayed effective date until 2002. 8
In August 2001, there appeared to be sufficient bipartisan support and
presidential approval for the passage of a patients' bill of rights by the 107th
Congress. 9 The compromise piece of legislation did not expand consumer
protections as far as the Commission's recommendations, and thus would not
have been as broad as the requirements under the impending DOL regulations.
The extended date of the proposed legislation until October 2002,10 and the
further extension of the effective date of the impending DOL regulations until
2003,11 would have provided the courts with additional time to address how the
3 President Clinton's Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health

Care Industry issued recommendations in its November 20, 1997 report (referred to as the
"Consumer Bill of Rights and Responsibilities").
4 See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (2001) (first proposed in 42 Fed. Reg. 27,426 (May 27, 1977))
(referred to in the text as the initial DOL claim procedure regulations).
' 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (2001) (first proposed in 63 Fed. Reg. 48,390 (Sept. 9, 1998)) (referred to
in
6 the text as the proposed DOL claims procedure regulations).
ld.
71d.

" 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (2001) (first proposed in 65 Fed. Reg. 70,265-66 (Nov. 21, 2000))
(referred to in the text as the impending DOL claims procedure regulations). These regulations
were initially effective for claims filed under a plan on or after January 1, 2002. 65 Fed. Reg.
70,271 (Nov. 21, 2000). The Bush administration placed a 60-day freeze on the effective date of
regulations issued during the latter months of the Clinton administration. See Memorandum For
the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Subject: Regulatory Review,
January 20, 2001, issued by Andrew H. Card, Jr. Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases.
9 See Bipartisan Patient Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 2563, 107th Cong. (2001) (as amended by
numbered 2 and 3 in House Report 107-184); Bipartisan Patient Protection Act of 2001, S.1052,
107th Cong. (2001).
10Both Bipartisan Patient Protection Act bills have delayed the effective date of their proposed
legislation until October 1, 2002. H.R. 2563; S.1052.
11The DOL delayed the impending claims procedure regulations between six months and one year
from the initial date of January 1, 2002, in order to afford group health plans additional time to
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legislative changes mesh with the present rules, as well as the validity of the
DOL's exercise of regulatory power to implement sweeping changes.
Unfortunately, due to the terrorists' attacks of September 11, 2001, the focus of
thel07th Congress has been shifted to anti-terrorist legislation, and away from
other issues, including the patients' bill of rights. Thus, any legislative changes
in the area of expanded employee benefits rights will be deferred to subsequent
years, leaving the courts with the continued challenge of formulating ERISA
participants' rights and enforcement procedures, especially in light of the DOL
regulations which promulgate rules that have not yet reached legislative
approval. Of course, given the change to a Republican administration in 2001,
the DOL may be directed to rescind their regulations and adopt alternative
regulations prior to the 2003 effective date.
This article will examine the profound changes over the past twenty-six years
in the development of ERISA's civil procedure requirements; because the
language of ERISA is silent as to many of these requirements, many rules have
been developed through judicial doctrine. Such judicially-crafted civil procedure
requirements have proven to be outcome determinative in certain benefit claim
suits, affording a mighty shield for plan sponsors and insurers in the denial of
benefit claims. As each of the eleven civil procedure rules is discussed (Sections
III. A through 111. K, below), the author will note how each such rule would be
altered under the proposed legislation and under the impending DOL final
regulations. While ERISA offers a variety of causes of action, this article is
limited to the civil procedure rules applicable to the adjudication of benefit
claims under ERISA plans, and to the resulting major public-policy implications
for benefit structure and scope.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
ERISA is an acronym for the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, originally designed to protect participants' rights under employee benefit
plans and to provide plan sponsors and other plan fiduciaries with uniform sets of
rules regarding the standards of conduct, responsibility and obligations under
such plans.' 2 As these employee benefit plans are voluntary in nature, the courts
come into compliance. 66 Fed Reg. 35,886 (July 9, 2001). According to Ann Combs, Assistant
Secretary of Labor for the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration,
[t]he Department also believes that there is a significant likelihood that
Patients' Bill of Rights legislation directly affecting the procedural
requirements for group health plans addressed in the final rules will be enacted
before, or shortly after, the January 1, 2002, applicability date of the regulation.
For these reasons, the Department has determined that a limited and temporary
deferral of the applicability date of the claims procedure regulation for group
health plans is warranted.
Id.

12 See S. REP. No. 93-127, at 35 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4871 (describing

Senate version of enforcement provisions as intended to "provide both the Secretary and
participants and beneficiaries with broad remedies for redressing or preventing violations of
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have been cognizant of the plan sponsor's settlor rights in the drafting, amending,
and termination of such plans. 13 However, once employees are provided benefits
through these plans, ERISA sets forth appropriate causes of actions, remedies,
sanctions and access to the federal courts to enforce such rights,' 4 preempting
state legislation and regulations to the contrary. 5 Under ERISA's broad
preemption clause, Congress recognized the states' police powers over the
insurance, banking, and securities businesses and granted continued state
'6
regulation of such laws on employee benefit plans through its "savings clause."'
However, to prevent a state law from recognizing self-insured employee benefit
plans as an "insurance company" for purposes of its regulation,
ERISA's
7
"deemer clause" necessarily limits the states' regulatory power.'
Despite its explicit causes of actions, remedies and sanctions, ERISA itself
was silent on a number of important procedural aspects necessary to enforce a
claimant's substantive rights. 18 As noted by the Ninth Circuit in Scott v. Gulf Oil
Corp., "Congress intended for the courts, borrowing from state law where
appropriate, and guided by the policies expressed in ERISA and other federal
labor laws, to fashion a body of federal common law to govern ERISA suits." 19
Thus, for the past twenty-six years since ERISA's enactment, the federal courts
have been busy fashioning and developing a federal common law in those
contexts where ERISA
silent.
The evolution
civil procedure
rules by the federal courtsis has
resulted in a unique setofofERISA's
rules that can easily trap

[ERISA]"); H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 17 (1973) reprintedin 1974 U.S.S.C.A.N. 4639 ("describing
House version in identical terms," as quoted by the Supreme Court in Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516
U.S. 489, 512 (1996)).
13See Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996) (affirming the employer's settlor powers
to establish, amend and modify the terms of the plans and refusing to extend ERISA's fiduciary
duties with respect to such actions); Anderson v. Resolution Trust Corp., 66 F.3d 956, 960 (8th Cir.
1995) (affirming the plan sponsor's powers to amend or terminate the plan as business decisions,
not fiduciary acts); Haberern v. Kaupp Vascular Surgeons Ltd. Defined Benefit Pension Plan, 24
F.3d 1491, 1497-99 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that the determination of compensation for purposes of
benefit purposes was not a fiduciary act), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1149 (1995); Belade v. ITF Corp.,
909 F.2d 736, 737-38 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that the exclusion of a specific group of employees
was not a fiduciary act).
14 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1147 (2001).
1529 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2001). See the remarks of Rep. Dent, 120 CONG. REc. H29197 (daily ed.
Aug. 20 1974)
(Finally, I wish to make note of what is to many the crowning achievement of
this legislation, the reservation to Federal authority the sole power to regulate
the field of employee benefits plans. With the preemption of the field, we
round out the protection afforded participants by eliminating the threat of
conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulations.)
16 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (2001) (referring to what is known as ERISA's "savings clause").
1729 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (referring to what is known as ERISA's "deemer clause").

18See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987) (directing the federal lower courts to
develop a "federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans");
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 25 n.26 (1983).
19 754 F.2d 1499, 1502 (9th Cir. 1985).
20
See Helms v. Monsanto Co., 728 F.2d 1416, 1420 (11th Cir. 1984).
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an unsuspecting claimant and his/her representative. Additionally, a party's use
of these rules can "heavily influence" the outcome of the suit, not only at the
administrative level, but also at the judicial level. While such result is obviously
in direct conflict with ERISA's legislative intent to promote the right to benefits
for participants and beneficiaries, 2' the result is consistent with the general
federal civil procedures rules, which have been described as pro-defendant.22
In order to strengthen participants' rights, employees and self-employed
workers have become increasingly vocal in requesting legislative changes,
especially in the context of health care benefits, including employee health plans
covered by ERISA. In late 1996, President Clinton appointed a presidential
advisory commission, known as the Presidential Advisory Commission on
Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry (the
"Commission"), to make specific recommendations regarding consumer rights in
the health care system. 2 3
By November, the Commission issued its
recommendations (referred to as the "Consumer Bill of Rights and
Responsibilities") promoting the following health consumer protections: better
access to information; choice of health care providers; faster access to emergency
services; consumer participation in treatment choices; assurances of
nondiscrimination and confidentiality in the delivery of medical services; and
grievance and appeals procedures. 24 President Clinton urged Congress to make
the legislative changes necessary to implement the Commission's
recommendations applicable to private health plans, providers, and health care
facilities. 25 At the same time, the President also issued a memorandum to the
Secretaries of Defense, Labor, Health and Human Services, and Veterans Affairs,
21 See 29

U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994) (declaring that the policy of ERISA is

to protect... the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their
beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants and
beneficiaries of financial and other information with respect thereto, by
establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries
of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies,
sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts).
22 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994). See also S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 61
F.3d 305 (7th Cir. 1995) (describing Rules 68 and 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as
pro-defendant, but acknowledging that in many other respects, the rules may be described as proplaintiff); Irving Joyner, Litigating Police Misconduct Claims in North Carolina, 19 N.C. CENT.
L.J. 113, 143-44 (1991) (discussing means of reducing the cost of discovery for the plaintiff);
Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,86
COLUM. L. REv. 433, 486-88 (1986).
23 See Exec. Order No. 13,017, 61 Fed. Reg. 47,659 (Sept. 5, 1996).
24 See Medical Savings Account: Economist, Aide Call MSAS Key to Efforts to Reform Health
System, 24 BNA PENSIONS & BENEFITS 46 (November 25, 1997); States Said Already Enforcing
Rightsfor Managed Care Consumers, BNA PENSIONS & BENEFITS DAILY (BNA) (Dec. 8, 1997). A
copy of the bill of rights document issued by the Commission and reported to the President of the
United States is available on its Internet home page at http://www.hcqualitycommission.gov (last
revised
Nov. 14, 2001).
25
See U.S. CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICES, CRS ISSUE BRIEF: MANAGED HEALTH
CARE: MAJOR ISSUES INTHE 105TH CONGRESS (1998).
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directing them to use their regulatory powers through regulations, advisories, and
26
other guidance to implement the Commission's recommendations.
Pursuant to these directives, in September 1998, the DOL made sweeping
proposed changes to ERISA's claims procedure regulations, implementing a
number of the Commission's recommendations, as well as repealing a number of
judicial doctrines used in litigating ERISA claims. 27 The DOL received heavy
criticism and an unprecedented number of comments from employers, plans, and
health care providers on their proposals. 28 Because Congress failed to pass
legislative changes during 1999 and 2000, the DOL issued, in the final days of
the Clinton Administration, final patients' rights claims procedural regulations
that included many of these failed legislative initiatives. 29 The effective date of
these final rules was initially delayed until 2002;30 however, in the wake of mid2001 legislative efforts that appeared to have greater chance of passage, the DOL
delayed the rules' effective date an additional six months to one year. 31
Legislative efforts that had a real chance for passage in mid-2001 were proposed
to be effective in October 2002.32 The 2001 legislative compromises did not
broaden patients' rights to the full extent of the Commission's recommendations
26 See Memorandum on Federal Agency Compliance with the Patient Bill of Rights, 34 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 298 (Feb. 20, 1998).
27 See 29 C.F.R § 2560.503-1 (2001). In a press release issued prior to the proposed regulations,
Secretary of Labor Alexis Herman acknowledged that the "DOL has been limited by the statute in
its ability to ensure that ERISA-covered health plans have sufficient consumer protections." See
Press Release, Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, Labor Department Announces
Initiatives to Implement President Clinton's Consumer Bill of Rights Directive (Feb. 20, 1998),
availableat http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/pwba/pwb98069.htm. In her testimony before the
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, DOL
Assistant Secretary Berg noted the advantages of various House and Senate bills, such as S.
1890/H.R.3605, the Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 1998 sponsored by Sen. Daschle (D-S.D.) and
Rep. Dingell (D-Mich.); and the Patient Access to Responsible Care Act (S. 644/H.R. 1415),
introduced by Sen. D'Amato (R-N.Y.) and Rep. Norwood (R.-Ga.), which addressed the
strengthening of health plans' internal claims procedures, the right to appeal to outside parties, and
the improper denial and delay in the processing of health benefit claims. See Elizabeth A. White,
Berg Calls For FurtherProtections Under ERISA ForHealth Plan Participants,BNA PENSION &
BENEFITS DAILY (BNA) (May 15, 1998).
28 See Preamble, 65 Fed. Reg. 70,246 (Nov. 21, 2000), where the DOL reported that over 700
written comments were received and over 60 speakers appeared at the public hearing.
29 See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (2001). As noted on the DOL's fact sheet, these patients' rights
claims procedure changes were designed to "ensure that group health plan participants in today's
managed care environment have access to a faster, fairer, fuller process for benefit
determinations." www.DOLclaimsFactSheet.html (January 25, 2001). As such, the regulations
provide faster response time for health benefit claim decisions; faster appeal time of denial claims;
review of an adverse benefit determination made de novo by a named fiduciary that was not the
initial claim reviewer; faster access to courts even prior to exhaustion of administrative remedies if
the plan fails to comply with the regulations in all respects. Id.
30 See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(o) (applying the regulations to claims filed under a plan on or after
January 1, 2002).
31 See 66 Fed. Reg. at 35,886 (July 9, 2001).
32 See Bipartisan Patient Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 2563, 107th Cong. (2001) (as amended by
numbered 2 and 3 in House Report 107-184); Bipartisan Patient Protection Act of 2001, S. 1052,
107th Cong. (2001).
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or DOL finalized regulations. 33 Thus, future questions for the courts to address
will include the adoption of any new legislative changes to ERISA's civil
procedure rules, as well as the regulatory powers of the DOL to implement
changes not contained in the final patients' bill of rights, and to repeal judicially
formulated doctrines under ERISA which have not been altered by legislation.
III. EVOLUTION OF ERISA'S CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES
If a participant or beneficiary believes he or she is entitled to a benefit under
an ERISA plan, the first step in pursuit of the benefit is to file a claim for benefit
under the plan.34 If the claim is denied, the plan must provide an internal review
procedure in order for the claimant to appeal the initial benefits' denial. 35 If
benefits are denied at this second level, ERISA affords a cause of action for such
benefit denial. 36 While such a claim for benefits is a substantive issue, there are a
number of significant and perilous procedural rules confronting a claimant before
he or she can pursue a benefits denial cause of action: whether the law of ERISA
is even applicable; whether an ERISA cause of action may be alleged; whether
the plaintiff has standing to bring the ERISA cause of action; what courts have
subject matter jurisdiction over the ERISA cause of action; whether the
defendant can remove the case from state court to federal court; which courts
have venue; whether ERISA's statute of limitations has expired; whether the
plaintiff must exhaust the plan's administrative remedies prior to initiating a
cause of action; what is the judicial standard of review applicable to the
fiduciary's decision to deny the claim; whether the courts are limited by the
administrative record of the plan's fiduciary or whether new evidence may be
submitted by the plaintiff; and, finally, whether the plaintiff is entitled to a jury
trial. The answer to each question is a stepping stone to the next question and
will ultimately determine whether the plaintiff is successful in his or her appeal.
Since the regulatory and judicial rules are not always consistent in the application
of each question, the outcome of the plaintiffs appeal is anything but clear. The
lack of uniformity also frustrates plan administrators who attempt to apply the
plan's claim procedure rules on a consistent fashion, regardless of the various
jurisdictions of possible claimants.
A. Whether ERISA is Applicable
ERISA applies only to covered employee benefit plans; those plans which are
established and maintained by an employer or an employee organization.37 Thus
the first step is to ascertain whether the plan in question is a covered ERISA plan
or whether it is subject to one of the numerous exceptions under ERISA's rules.
The second step is then to ascertain whether such plan is one that is established
3' 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1994).
'4 29 U.S.C. § 1133(1).
'5 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2).
36 See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
37

See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1), (2).
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or maintained by an employer or employee organization. The final issue in order
to allege an ERISA cause of action is whether the claim for relief "relates to" the
ERISA covered plan. Unless all three elements are present, the claimant will be
unsuccessful in his/her initial pursuit of an ERISA cause of action for benefits.
An ERISA covered plan is essential in order to assert an ERISA cause of
action, otherwise federal courts will lack jurisdiction over the matter.38 As to
whether the plan in question is covered, ERISA is generally applicable to a wide
variety of employee welfare benefit plans 39 and employee pension benefit
plans.4 0 Exclusion from ERISA's overall mandates exist only for a select group
of employee benefit plans, such as governmental plans; church plans; plans
designed to comply with state workmen compensation laws, unemployment
compensation, or disability insurance laws; plans maintained for nonresident
aliens; and unfunded excess benefit plans (which provide pension-type benefits
in excess of the maximum contribution/benefit limitations imposed by the
41
Internal Revenue Code's qualification rules for highly paid individuals).
Unless the plan falls within one of these named exceptions, it will be governed
by the federal rules of ERISA and state laws attempting to regulate such plans
will be deemed preempted.
The second question focuses on whether the covered employee benefit plan
is "established or maintained" by an employer and/or an employee organization.
Generally this is not an issue; employers desire to establish and maintain
employee benefit plans in order to deliver tax-exempt welfare or pension/profit
38 See, e.g., Kenney v. Roland Parson Contracting Corp., 28 F.3d 1254, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1994); MD
Physician & Assoc., Inc. v. Texas Bd. of Ins., 957 F.2d 178, 183 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506
U.S. 861 (1992); Texas v. Alliance Leasing Corp., 797 F. Supp. 542, 545 (N.D. Tex. 1992); Hansen
v. Con't Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971, 977 (5th Cir. 1991).
'9 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1), (2) (2000) (defining an employee welfare benefit plan as
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the
extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the
purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the
purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical or hospital care or
benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or
unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs,
or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or (B) any
benefit described in section 186(c) of this title (other than pensions on
retirement or death, and insurance to provide such pensions.).
40 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1), (2) (2000) (defining an employee pension benefit plan as
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the
extent that by its express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances such
plan, fund, or program (i) provides retirement income to employees, or (ii)
results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the
termination of covered employment or beyond, regardless of the method of
calculating the contributions made to the plan, the method of calculating the
benefits under the plan or the method of distributing benefits from the plan.).
41 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1003(3)(b)(1)-(5) (1999).
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sharing benefits to their employees. However, the issue does surface in group
insurance programs offered to the employees by the employer/employee
organization, where the latter is simply acting as a conduit for the payment of
group insurance benefits (i.e., the employer simply remits the insurance
premiums to the insurer). In its regulations, the DOL has a safe harbor provision
that insulates the employer/employee organization from ERISA coverage
provided four conditions are satisfied: (1) the employer/employee organization
does not make any contributions of its own to the insurer; (2) employee
participation in the program is voluntary; (3) the sole function of the
employer/employee organization is to collect and remit the premiums to the
insurer (without endorsement of the program); and. (4) no consideration is
received other than reasonable compensation for these administrative services.42
Most often, litigation is directed at the third factor - whether the employer's level
of involvement is more than minimal. Some circuits find that minimal employer
involvement is sufficient for employer involvement with the plan.4 3 Other
circuits require substantially more to hold the employer responsible for the
plan. 44 Two circuits have gone beyond the use of the DOL's safe harbors to pose
the question of whether an ERISA plan exists.45
The final question in determining ERISA's applicability turns to ERISA's
preemption clause; a clause which preempted state laws that "relate to" a covered
ERISA plan, unless permitted by the savings clause. 46 Such an issue becomes
extremely important if the claimant is asserting a state cause of action for relief,
either solely or in connection with the ERISA denial for benefits claim. If the
claim for relief does not relate to a covered ERISA plan, it is not covered under
ERISA and therefore not preemptive of state law, paving the way for state
adjudication of the plaintiffs rights. For plaintiffs, state causes of action may

42

See 29 C.F.R. §§ 2560.503-10)(1)-(4) (2001).

43 See Randol v. Mid-West Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 987 F.2d 1547, 1551-52 (11th Cir. 1993) (finding

employer's involvement due to evidence of employer premium checks), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 863
(1993); Custer v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 417 (4th Cir. 1993) (implying that
employer's negotiation rights, payment of costs, powers to cancel and replace the policy constituted
sufficient employer involvement); Int'l Resources v. New York Life Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 294, 298
(6th Cir. 1991) (finding employer involvement due to choice in benefit plan and contracting with
agency); Brundage-Peterson v. Compcare Health Serv. Ins. Corp., 877 F.2d 509, 511 (7th Cir.
1989) (stating employer's right to contract with multiple carriers for the employees to choose from
constitutes sufficient employer involvement).
44 See Cruli v. GEM Ins. Co. 58 F.3d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1995) (acting as administrator and
performing administrative tasks beyond the payment of premiums amounted to employer
involvement); Peterson v. Am. Life & Health Ins. Co., 48 F.3d 404, 408 (9th Cir. 1995) (choosing
and contacting the insurance carrier and distributing information regarding the plan constituted
involvement by the employer), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 942 (1995).
45 See Zavora v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 145 F.3d 1118, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 1998). See also
Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1373 (11th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (requiring more than the
mere purchase of insurance to conclusively prove the existence of a plan).
46 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(a), (b)(2) (1999).
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provide for more relief than provided under ERISA, as the latter presently denies
extracontractual and putative damages.47

B. ERISA Causes of Action
Once ERISA has been determined to be applicable, there are a variety of
different causes of action that may be considered under ERISA, each with
different classes of plaintiffs and defendants and each with a different set of
remedies.48 In the context of a benefit denial claim, ERISA section 502(a)(1)
explicitly provides relief to a plan participant or beneficiary to recover benefits
due under the plan. 49 The intent of the cause of action is to permit a participant
or beneficiary to enforce personal monetary rights under the terms of the plan,
not to assert statutory violations under ERISA. 50 This specific cause of action
47 See Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248 (1993) (preventing monetary damages as "other

equitable relief' afforded under ERISA section 502(a)(3)); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473
U.S. 134, 144, 148 (1985) (denying extra-contractual damages for relief under ERISA's breach of
fiduciary cause of action). Though the Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the issue of
compensatory and punitive damages under subsections of ERISA section 502, the majority of lower
courts do not permit such damages. See Allinder v. Inter-City Prods. Corp., 152 F.3d 544, 552 (6th
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1178 (1999); Farr v. US West Communications Inc., 151 F.3d
908, 916 (9th Cir. 1998); Bast v. Prudential Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir. 1998); Jass v.
Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1491 (7th Cir. 1996); In re Unisys Corp. Retiree
Med. Benefit ERISA Litig., 57 F.3d 1255, 1268 (3d Cir. 1995); Landwehr v. DuPree, 72 F.3d 726,
735 (9th Cir. 1995); Zimmerman v. Sloss Equip., Inc., 72 F.3d 822, 828 (10th Cir. 1995); Lafoy v.
HMO Colorado, 988 F.2d 97, 99 (10th Cir. 1993); Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc.,
974 F.2d 270, 286 (2d Cir. 1992); Corcoran v. United Healthcare, 965 F.2d 1321, 1325-26 (5th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992); Harsch v. Eisenberg, 956 F.2d 651, 655-61 (7th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 818 (1992); Novak v. Andersen Corp., 962 F.2d 757, 759-61 (8th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 959 (1993); First Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Sunshine-Jr. Food Stores, Inc.,
960 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993); Eckert Cold Storage,
Inc., v. Behl, 943 F. Supp. 1230, 1236-37 (E.D. Cal. 1996); DeLaurentis v. Job Shop Technical
Servs., Inc., 912 F. Supp. 57, 62-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 880 F. Supp. 63,
72-73 (D. Mass. 1995); Thomas v. Allen-Stone Boxes, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1316, 1321 (W.D. Tenn.
1995); Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 879 F. Supp. 802, 825-27 (S.D. Ohio 1994). See also JAMES
JORDAN ET. AL., HANDBOOK ON ERISA LITIGATION, 3-107 TO 3-108, 4-44 TO 4-46 (2d ed. 1996 &
Supp.2001).
48 Following the Supreme Court's direction in Russell, 473 U.S. 134,
the federal courts look
narrowly to the particular ERISA section 502 claim being alleged and the claim for relief. See
Jordan v. Fed. Express Corp., 116 F.3d 1005, 1011-14 (3d Cir. 1997). Thus, litigators are advised
to allege the specific claim for relief under the specific cause of action listed within ERISA section
502.
49 The DOL may intervene and act as a receiver in civil actions brought by a plan participant or
beneficiary if a novel ERISA issue is at stake or the rights/responsibilities of a large number of
ERISA claimants may be affected by the outcome of such case. See Marshall v. Snyder, 430 F.
Supp. 1224, 1226-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd in part, remanded in part, 572 F.2d 894 (2d Cir.
1978).
50 Federal courts acknowledge that ERISA provides a separate cause of action to redress
ERISA
statutory violations under 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(3) (2001). See Wilkins v. Baptist Healthcare
System, Inc., 150 F.3d 609, 615-16 (6th Cir. 1998); Jordan v. Fed. Express Corp., 116 F.3d 1005,
1011-12 (3d Cir. 1997); Meade v. Pension Appeals & Review Comm., 966 F.2d 190, 194 (6th Cir.
1992); Harsch v. Eisenberg, 956 F.2d 651, 656-58 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 818
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also provides equitable relief to enforce the payment of benefits due under the
plan or to provide declaratory relief as to the claimant's right to benefits under
the plan. The defendant may either be the plan, as it is liable to pay benefits, or
the plan administrator,if it has discretionary powers under the plan to interpret
plan provisions and determine eligibility for benefits. 5' A plan administrator
with only ministerial functions regarding the payment of benefits is not a suitable
defendant in a benefit denial claims action.52
An alternate cause of action for a benefit denial claim that may be alleged is
suit for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA section 502(a)(2), on the theory
that either (1) the plan administrator as fiduciary is required under the plan to pay
benefits in accordance with the plan terms, and failure to do so constitutes a
breach of that fiduciary duty,53 or (2) that systematic failure to pay benefit claims
may rise to the level of a fiduciary breach.54 Unfortunately the Supreme Court
has limited relief under this specific cause of action to the plan as a whole, and
not individual relief, making it unattractive for an individual plaintiff lawsuit.55
Hence a claimant alleging such a cause of action does so as representative of the
plan participants/beneficiaries.
Another possible cause of action a participant/beneficiary may pursue in a
benefits denial claim is suit under ERISA section 502(a)(3) to enjoin activities
that violate ERISA or the terms of the plan so as to obtain other equitable relief
to redress such violations. 56 However, the courts will not entertain claims that
(1992); Gridley v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., 924 F.2d 1310, 1318 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 501
U.S. 1232 (1991); Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1161 (3d Cir. 1990).
51See Crocco v. Xerox Corp., 137 F.3d 105, 107-08 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that the plan, not the
employer, is the proper defendant in a benefit denials claim as the plan); Giardono v. Jones, 867
F.2d 409, 411-12 (7th Cir. 1989); Sahlie v. Nolen, 984 F. Supp. 1389, 1394 (M.D. Ala. 1997). But
see Fenton Indus., Inc., v. Nat'l Shopmen's Pension Fund, 674 F.2d 1300, 1304-05 (9th Cir. 1982)
(permitting the employer as defendant provided the plaintiffs injury was within the zone of ERISA
protected interests); Beegan v. Associated Press, 43 F. Supp. 2d 70 (D. Me. 1999) (permitting
employer as defendant due to its control over the administrative aspects of the plan); Best v. Nissan
Motor Corp., 973 F. Supp. 770 (M.D. Tenn. 1997).
52 See Riordan v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 953 F. Supp. 952, 956 (N.D. 111.1996), aff'd, 128
F.3d 549 (7th Cir. 1997). But see Garren v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 114 F.3d 186
(1 th Cit. 1997); Pecor v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 869 F. Supp. 651 (E.D. Wis. 1994); Roeder
v. ChemRex Inc., 863 F. Supp. 817 (E.D. Wis. 1994).
" 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (2001) (providing a cause of action for violations for breaches of
fiduciary duties, with the requisite relief provided under 29 U.S.C. § 1109).
'4 See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russel, 473 U.S. 134, 142 (1985) (holding that an individual
delay in the processing of benefit claims did not warrant a claim for breach of fiduciary duties
under ERISA). But cf Caterino v. Barry, 8 F.3d 878 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding that failure to transfer
fund assets to a separate pension fund was not arbitrary); Phillips v. Alaska Hotel and Rest. Emp.
Pension Fund, 944 F.2d 509, 519 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that restrictive vesting standards were
neither arbitrary nor capricious), as amended, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 28491 (9th Cir. Dec. 6,
1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 911 (1992); Ganton Tech. v. Nat'l Indus. Group Pension Plan, 865 F.
Supp. 201, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (considering the resolution of claims in contexts of whether the
benefit programs were designed by the plan fiduciaries, and not the plan administrator).
55 See Russell, 473 U.S. at 142 n.9.
56 See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 512 (1996) (referring to the ERISA section 502(a)(3)
causes of action as the "catch all" provisions which act as a "safety net").
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include breaches of fiduciary duties under this subsection, as an adequate remedy
is available under ERISA section 502(a)(2).57 Hence, claims not covered
specifically under the other subsections of ERISA section 502 may fall under this
"catch all" provision, which serves a "safety net" function by affording equitable
relief for such violations.58 The defendant under such cause of action is the plan
fiduciary or non-fiduciary who allegedly violated ERISA or the terms of the plan.
Remedies under such cause of action include "appropriate equitable relief," thus
affording an additional remedy not provided for under section 502(a)(2) (limited
to section 409 relief) or section 502(a)(1)(B) (recovery of benefits, enforcement
or clarification of rights).59 The courts are in agreement that relief under this
cause of action is generally denied if the individual participant/beneficiary6 is
seeking relief under both sections 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(3) in the same suit. 0
The applicable availability of relief under the various ERISA causes of action
make a simple cause of action for a participant extremely outcome determinative,
as the type of relief sought will drive the cause of action pleaded by the plaintiff.
Other applicable ERISA civil procedure aspects will also prove to be outcome
determinative - e.g., judicial standard of review, administrative record
considered by the courts.
The end result of a considerable amount of ERISA litigation has been to
protect the defendant from liability. The recent patients' bills of rights passed by
the House and Senate in mid-2001 would add to the list of ERISA causes of
action, providing a cause of action for failure to exercise ordinary care in the
delivery of health benefits. 6' Damages under this cause of action could extend to
punitive and pain and suffering forms of relief.62 The recently finalized DOL
regulations attempt not only to rebut, but to usurp such preferences. The author
speculates that the volume of ERISA claims litigation will increase exponentially
if the now-finalized DOL regulations are upheld by the courts; the courts'
response to the DOL regulations will either accept or limit the volume of such
litigation.

57
58

id.

id.

'9 See id.

60 See Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1997).
61 Bipartisan Patient Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 2563, 107th Cong. (2001); Bipartisan Patient
Protection Act of 2001, S. 1052, 107th Cong. (2001).
62 H.R. 2563, passed by the House on August 2, 2001, provides a cause of action relating to the
provision of health care benefits where there was failure to exercise ordinary care, but excludes
treating physicians as possible defendants. Under this House version, noneconomic damages
would be capped at $1.5 million and states would have the power to limit the extent of total
damages. Id. The Senate's bill, S. 1052, passed on June 14, 2001, would provide a similar cause of
action under ERISA, but excludes treating physicians and hospitals as possible defendants.
Additionally, this version limits punitive damages to $5 million and would not allow states to limit
the extent of damages. Id.
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C. Standing to Sue Under ERISA
Each ERISA cause of action is afforded to a unique class of potential
plaintiffs. Thus, the fact that someone or some entity has a complaint involving
an employee benefit plan is only the beginning of the inquiry. Under ERISA
section 502's civil enforcement provisions for a claims denial or plan/ERISA
violation claim, there are four specific classes of potential plaintiffs allowed to
bring suit: plan participants, plan beneficiaries, plan fiduciaries, and the Secretary
of the Labor. Other parties are left without any remedy under ERISA' s causes of
action. 6 3 Such result (i.e., being without an ERISA cause of action) may be
due to the courts'
either a sword or a shield for the claimant
64 involved
implementation of ERISA's preemption clause.
ERISA defines "plan participant" as "any employee or former employee of
an employer ...who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type
from an employee benefit plan . . .or whose beneficiaries may be eligible to
receive any such benefit., 65 Thus, the definition sets up four categories of
participants: employees who are eligible or may be eligible for a benefit, and
former employees who are eligible or may be eligible for a benefit. As to the
category of "employee," the Supreme Court in Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v.
67
Darden6 6 adopted the common law definition of employee for this purpose.
63 See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27 (1983) (stating that
"ERISA carefully enumerates the parties entitled to seek relief under § 502; it does not provide
anyone other than participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries with an express cause of action");
McBride v. PLM Int'l, Inc., 179 F.3d 737, 742 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating the list of potential claimants
given in ERISA section 502 is exclusive); Coyne & Delaney Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 102
F.3d 712, 715 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that fiduciaries are not authorized to sue for benefits); SelfIns. Inst. of Am. v. Korioth, 993 F.2d 479, 484-85 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that a trade association
has standing as fiduciary); Coleman v. Champion Int'l Corp., 992 F.2d 530, 536 (5th Cir. 1993)
(holding that the participant's son was not a beneficiary and had no standing); Jamail, Inc. v.
Carpenters Dist. Council Pension & Welfare Trusts, 954 F.2d 299, 303 (5th Cir. 1992) (excluding
employers from the list of those entitled to a private cause of action); Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N.
Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting an insurance company's standing as it did not
fall within ERISA's list of enumerated parties); Teagardner v. Republic-Franklin, Inc. Pension
Plan, 909 F.2d 947, 954 (6th Cir. 1990) (rejecting plaintiff's standing as they were no longer
participants or beneficiaries); New Jersey State AFL-CIO v. New Jersey, 747 F.2d 891, 893 (3d
Cir. 1984) (holding that labor unions are not participants or beneficiaries under ERISA).
64Plaintiffs sufficiently removed from the plan so as to lack standing may then be able to benefit
from state causes of actions or defenses that may be "too tenuous, remote or peripheral a manner"
to "relate to" a plan covered under ERISA, which are not subject to ERISA's preemption clause.
See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983).
65 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (2001).
' 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992).
67 Id. See also the thirteen-factor definition enunciated by the Supreme Court in Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989) (including such factors as:
the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is
accomplished .. .; the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and
tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the
parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the
hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long
to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying
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The Supreme Court found ERISA's definition of an "employee" as "any
individual employed by an employer" to be "completely circular and explain[ing]
nothing." 68 Thus it resorted to the common law test and agency principles for
guidance.69 The traditional common law test used to distinguish employees-from
independent contractors has thirteen
factors to consider, none of which are the
70
sole determinative of the result.
The DOL has noted in its regulations that plans covering only sole
proprietors, owners or partners (all of which are not common-law employees) are
not employee benefits plans for purposes of ERISA.71 Since a sole proprietor,
owner, or partner of a business is not an "employee" for purposes of ERISA, the
consequence for such individuals is that they lack standing as "employees" to
bring a suit for relief under an ERISA plan.72 Most courts rely on the DOL
regulations and hold that sole proprietors, owners, partners, and even outside
directors are not "employees" for purposes of ERISA.
However, a common question that may arise for sole proprietors, owners and
partners who participate in plans with other common law employees is whether
such individuals have dual status as employree and owner/partner in order to have
standing to pursue a benefit claims case.
In such a context, there is a split
among the circuit courts as to the owner/partner's standing to sue in the context

assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party;
whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and
the tax treatment of the hired party).
68 Darden, 503 U.S. at 323.
69 Id. at 323-24.
70 See Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296, 298-99 (1987). For cases utilizing Darden, see also
Trombetta v. Cragin Fed. Bank for Sav. ESOP, 102 F.3d 1435, 1440 (7th Cir. 1996); Berger
Transfer & Storage v. Cent. States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 85 F.3d 1374, 1378-79 (8th
Cir. 1996); Sharkey v. Ultramar Energy Ltd., 70 F.3d 226, 231-32 (2d Cir. 1995); Robinson v.
Linomaz, 58 F.3d 365, 369 (8th Cir. 1995); Madonia v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 11 F.3d 444,
448-49 (4th Cir. 1993); Eichhorn, Eichhorn & Link v. Travelers Ins. Co., 896 F. Supp. 812, 814 n.3
(N.D. Ind. 1995); Glover v. Jobmate, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 926, 930-31 (S.D. Miss. 1995); Simpson v.
Ernst & Young, 879 F. Supp. 802, 814-15 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
7' See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3(a)(1)-(2) (2001) (stating that
[an individual and his or her spouse shall not be deemed to be employees with
respect to a trade or business, whether incorporated or unincorporated, which is
wholly owned by the individual or by the individual and his or her spouse, and
[a] partner in a partnership and his or her spouse shall not be deemed to be
employees with respect to the partnership).
72 See Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 264 (9th Cir. 1991) (negating the use of
ERISA for plans whose only beneficiaries are company owners).
73 See Robertson v. Alexander Grant Co., 798 F.2d 868, 871 (5th Cir. 1986) (relying upon
DOL
regulations to hold that partners are not employees); Grantham v. Beatrice Co., 776 F. Supp. 391,
400-03 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that outside directors are not employees).
74 These cases arise in the context of a plaintiff asserting state law claims and the defendant
challenging that such claims are preempted by ERISA. See Spurlock v. Employers Health Ins. Co.,
13 F. Supp. 2d 884 (E.D. Wis. 1998); Apffel v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 972 F. Supp. 396 (S.D.
Tex. 1997).
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of a plan that also covers common-law employees.75 Some courts reason that
although the owner/partner is not an employee under the plan, he or she is a
beneficiary under the ERISA plan and thus has standing as "beneficiary" to sue
for ERISA benefits.76 Others circuits continue to rely on the explicit words of
which exclude owners/partners from
ERISA or the DOL regulations noted earlier
77
"participant.,
or
the class of "employee"
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, the Supreme Court expanded the
category of former employees with standing to sue to include employees who
"have ...a reasonable expectation of returning to covered employment" or who
have "a colorable claim" to vested benefits.78 In Firestone, an employer
maintained a termination pay plan and two other unfunded employee benefit
plans covered under ERISA.79 When the employer sold one of its plastics
divisions to Occidental Petroleum Co., the employees of which were promptly
rehired by Occidental Petroleum, six affected employees sought severance
benefits under the employer's termination pay plan and sought information about
their benefits under all three plans. 80 In denying the request for information, the
employer argued that the affected employees were no longer plan "participants"
and thus had no standing. 8' In rejecting the Third Circuit's interpretation that a
participant is anyone who claims to be one, the Supreme Court stated a more
includes employees or those
natural interpretation of the term "participant"
82
Such interpretation also applies to the
reasonably expected to be employees.
term "former participant," such that former employees with a "reasonable
expectation of returning to covered employment" or those with "a colorable
claim to vested benefits" have standing to sue.83
75See Vega v. Nat'l Life Ins. Servs., Inc., 188 F.3d 287, 294 (5th Cir. 1999); Robinson v. Limonaz,

58 F.3d 365, 369-70 (8th Cir. 1995); Peterson v. Am. Life & Health Ins. Co., 48 F.3d 404, 409 (9th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 942 (1995); Fugarino v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 969
F.2d 178, 185-86 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 966 (1993); Kwatcher v. Mass. Serv.
Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 961-62 (1st Cir. 1989); Giardono v. Jones, 867 F.2d 409,
411-12 (7th Cir. 1989); Peckman v. Bd. of Trs. of the Int'l Bhd. of Painters, 653 F.2d 424, 426-27
(10th Cir. 1981), vacated in part, modified on othergrounds, 724 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1983).
76 See Wolk v. UNUM Life Ins. of Am., 186 F.3d 352, 356 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that a partner is
a beneficiary); Vega, 188 F.3d at 294 (holding that sole owner is a beneficiary); Robinson, 58 F.3d
at 369-70 (holding that a sole shareholder is a beneficiary); Peterson, 48 F.3d at 409 (holding that
any person designated to receive benefits is a beneficiary); Bellisario v. Lone Star Life Ins., 871 F.
Supp. 374, 379 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that any person designated to receive benefits is a
beneficiary).
77See Fugarino,969 F.2d at 185-86 (relying on DOL regulations to conclude that a sole proprietor
is not a participant or beneficiary and his spouse and son are dependents, not beneficiaries, under
the plan); Kwatcher, 879 F.2d at 961-62 (affirming the DOL's decision to ban owner-employees
from plan participation); Giardono, 867 F.2d at 411-12 (rejecting the argument that a sole
proprietor qualifies as a plan participant); Peckham, 653 F.2d at 426-27 (relying on ERISA's antiassignment clause to prohibit employers from benefiting under the plan).
78 489 U.S. 101,117 (1989).
79
1d. at 105.
s Id. at 105-06.
sIId. at 106.
82
Id.at 117.
83Firestone,489 U.S. at 117.
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Courts have not given specific factors to utilize in ascertaining Firestone's
first prong - "reasonable expectation of returning to covered employment." 84 In
conclusory statements, the courts have affirmed that once an employee
terminates employment, it is not reasonable to presume that the terminated
employee will automatically be reemployed. 85 In collective bargaining contexts,
the courts have been willing to examine evidence relating to the claimant's
statutory or contractual rights to reemployment or the claimant's recall rights
under a collective
bargaining agreement in ascertaining the reasonableness of
86
reemployment.
However, regarding Firestone'ssecond prong - "colorable claim" to benefits
- the courts are split in their interpretation as to how broad the net extends to
potential claimants. 87 The issue that has caused this division among courts
involves situations where a former employee has already received all vested
benefits in a lump sum payment at the time of distribution under a plan that was
88
later amended to change the method used in determining lump sum payments.
In such situations, the Tenth Circuit has held that the claimant had no "colorable
claim" because he received all that he was entitled to when he accepted the
distribution, citing two earlier cases from the Fifth Circuit. 89 Although the
claimant was seeking additional benefits under the plan due to the plan
amendment, the court noted that he did not have a colorable claim to those
benefits, as those benefits had not vested at the time.90 The court also remarked
that the claimant had not sought reinstatement, and therefore had no reasonable

84 See Shawley v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 989 F.2d 652, 657 (3d Cir. 1993) (remarking that courts

do not enunciate factors for the "reasonable expectation" prong of the Firestonetest).
85See Panaras v. Liquid Carbonic Indus., 74 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that since
the claimant had terminated employment, there was no reasonable expectation of becoming
reemployed); Curtis v. Nev. Bonding Corp., 53 F.3d 1023, 1027 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding that
termination of employment does not give rise to a reasonable expectation of reemployment);
Alexander v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 990 F.2d 536, 539 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that the claimant
had not requested reinstatement of employment in the complaint which was indicative of his intent
not to seek reemployment).
86 See Shawley, 989 F.2d at 658 (noting that there were neither statutory nor contractual rights for
former employees guaranteeing rehire); Zydel v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 764 F. Supp. 277 (W.D.N.Y.
1991), modified, 798 F. Supp. 975, 981 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (affirming the use of the collective
bargaining agreement, prior practices, express promises and the pension plan provisions in
determining the claimant's expectation of returning to their former union positions).
87 See Christopher v. Mobil Oil Corp., 950 F.2d 1209, 1221 (5th Cir. 1992) (permitting
terminated
participants who had received distributions to have standing if the employer's conduct was in
violation of ERISA), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 820 (1992); Mitchell v. Mobil Oil Corp., 896 F.2d 463,
474 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that a terminated participant who had received vested benefits had no
"colorable claim" because he received a total distribution of his benefits from the plan), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 898 (1990).
88 See Christopher,950 F.2d at 1212-13; Mitchell, 896 F.2d at 466.
89 See Mitchell, 896 F.2d at 474 (citing Yancy v. American Petrofina, Inc., 768 F.2d 707, 708-09
(5th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) and Joseph v. New Orleans Electric Pension & Retirement Plan, 754
F.2d 628, 630 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1006 (1985), both holding that once a
participant receives all his vested benefits, he no longer is considered a plan participant).
Id.
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expectation of returning to reemployment. 9 ' Thus, the claim for benefits92 was a
claim for compensatory damages, not for enforcement of ERISA benefits.
Two years later, the Fifth Circuit in Christopherv. Mobil Oil Corp. had the
occasion to apply the Mitchell holding and affirm its earlier decisions regarding
The Christopher case involved similar facts to the Mitchell
standing to sue.
case - claimant seeking additional ERISA benefits due to plan amendments
enacted by the employer subsequent to their retirement. 94 The lower court had
dismissed the ERISA complaint on the grounds that the claimants were not
"participants" seeking recovery of ERISA benefits.95 The Fifth Circuit looked to
the interpretation of "colorable claim" noted in the Firestone decision (decided in
1989) and rejected a "straightforward formula" applicable to all standing
questions.9 6 Thus, the Fifth Circuit adopted a more liberal "but for" standard: "it
would seem more logical to say that but for the employer's conduct alleged to be
in violation of ERISA, the employee would be a current employee with a
reasonable expectation of receiving benefits, and the employer should not be able
through its own malfeasance to defeat the employee's standing., 97 The Fifth
Circuit's "but for" test has become the majority rule. 98 However, the Tenth
Circuit retains its contrary view even in light of the Firestonedecision.99
A secondary standing issue arises as to the validity of an ERISA action
where a plaintiff's claim is derivative through an individual who would have had
91 Id.
92

Id.

9 950 F.2d 1209, 1220-21 (5th Cir. 1992).
Ild. at 1212-13.

95
96

Id. at 1213.
Id. at 1221.

97 id.

98 See McBride v. PLM Int'l, Inc., 179 F.3d 737, 743 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming the use of the "but
for" test); Panaras v. Liquid Carbonic Indus., 74 F.3d 786, 791 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that
"standing is available to any former employee who has a colorable claim to benefits which the
employer promised to provide pursuant to the employment relationship and which a nonfrivolous
argument suggests have accrued to the employee's benefit," citing Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 14
F.3d 697, 703 (1st Cir. 1994), and Christopher v. Mobil Oil Corp., 950 F.2d 1209, 1221 (5th Cir.
1992)); Swinney v. Gen. Motors Corp., 46 F.3d 512, 518 (6th Cir. 1995) (affirming the "but for"
test used by the majority of circuits); Adamson v. Armco, Inc., 44 F.3d 650, 655 (8th Cir. 1995)
(limiting use of the "but for" standard to situations where the fiduciary's action deprived the
plaintiff of standing, not when the claimants' loss of participant status resulted from their own
actions, e.g., employees who voluntarily quit and sue for severance benefits), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
823 (1995); Vartanian, 14 F.3d at 702 (noting that the sole question was whether the plaintiff was
within "the zone of interest ERISA was intended to protect" and, if so, allowing standing); Mullins
v. Pfizer, Inc., 23 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming the "but for" test); Shawley v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 989 F.2d 652, 659 (3d Cir. 1993) (using the "but for" standard but deciding that the
glaintiffs had not shown that the defendant's actions divested them of employment status).
See Raymond v. Mobil Oil Corp., 983 F.2d 1528, 1536 (10th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the
Christopher"but for" test), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 822 (1993). See also Stanton v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
792 F.2d 432, 435 (4th Cir. 1986) (stating that "[t]he effect of reading a 'but for' test is to impose
participant status on every single employee who but for some future contingency may become
eligible"); Jackson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 648 F.2d 225, 228-29 (5th Cir. 1981) (rejecting a "but
for" analysis in determining standing).
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standing to sue (e.g., estate of the participant/beneficiary or an insurer with
assignment rights). The federal courts permit, without much discussion, a
personal representative of a deceased or disabled participant or beneficiary to
assert a claim for benefits, apparently presuming jurisdiction under ERISA.I °
However, the standing of health care providers and insurance companies as
assignees has not been presumed, but has been litigated instead. The majority of
the circuits have upheld the standing of assignees of participants' and
beneficiaries' welfare benefit claims, noting that ERISA's anti-assignment clause
is applicable only for pension benefits. 0 1
In Hermann Hospital v. MEBA Medical & Benefits Plan, °2 the Fifth Circuit
formulated two models for standing under ERISA claim cases - independent
standing (where the plaintiff is a participant or beneficiary) and derivative
standing (where health care benefits have been assigned by the participant or
beneficiary, conferring derivative status to the assignee). The court recognized
that the health care provider was not a beneficiary; however, acknowledging that
ERISA permits the assignment of health care benefits, a valid assignment permits
a participant or beneficiary to confer standing to a health care provider if the
assignment was valid.10 3 In forming its decision, the Fifth Circuit relied on the
holding in Misic v. The Building Service Employees Health and Welfare Trust
1oo See Sanders v. Int'l Soc'y for Performance Improvement, 740 A.2d 34, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1999);
Pitts v. Am. Sec. Life Ins. Co., 931 F.2d 351, 356 (5th Cir. 1991) (allowing a father to sue on
behalf of his disabled son after noting that the son had "a reasonable expectation of continued
benefits"); Randolph v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11715, at **6-7
(N.D. 111.Aug. 23, 1993) (granting standing to the estate administrator of a deceased participant);
Cottle v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 13, 1993) (affirming
standing for trustee of testamentary trust established by beneficiary under plan); James v. La.
Laborers Health & Welfare Fund, 766 F. Supp. 530, 534 (E.D. La. 1991) (holding that estate
administrator had standing); McKinnon v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 691 F. Supp. 1314, 1315
(N.D. Ala. 1988) (permitting the daughter to recover benefits of her deceased father).
101See HealthSouth Rehab. Hosp. v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 101 F.3d 1005, 1008 (4th Cir. 1996)
(rejecting the Christopher "but for" test), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1264 (1997); St. Francis Reg'l
Med. Ctr. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 49 F.3d 1460, 1464 (10th Cir. 1995) (interpreting
ERISA to permit the assignability of benefits to free negotiations and subject to contract);
Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., 944 F.2d 1272, 1278 (6th Cir. 1991) (rejecting the
assignment of a health care provider as it was neither a participant nor beneficiary); Kennedy v.
Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that the health care provider
was a beneficiary with standing to sue); Ark. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary's Hosp., 947
F.2d 1341, 1349-50 (8th Cir. 1991) (upholding a state assignment statute applicable to ERISA
welfare benefit plans), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 957 (1992); Davidowitz v. Delta Dental Plan, Inc.,
946 F.2d 1476, 1480-81 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding a welfare plan's anti-assignment clause to bar
assignment of benefits); Hermann Hosp. v. MEBA Med. & Benefits Plan, 845 F.2d 1286, 1289 (5th
Cir. 1988) (noting the absence of any statutory language which would prohibit such assignments);
Misic v. Bldg. Serv. Employees Health & Welfare Trust, 789 F.2d 1374, 1378 (9th Cir. 1986)
(permitting the assignee to stand in the shoes of the assignor); Wash. Hosp. Ctr. Corp. v. Group
Hospitalization and Med. Servs., Inc., 758 F. Supp. 750, 755 (D.D.C. 1991) (holding that
assignment of welfare benefits are valid and not contrary to public policy).
102845 F.2d 1286, 1289 (5th Cir. 1988).
103 Hermann, 845 F.2d at 1289 (noting that the assignment of health care benefits to providers
"facilitates rather than hampers the employee's receipt of health benefits").
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which stated that the assignee "stands in the shoes" of the assignor, such that, if
the assignment is valid, the assignee may assert whatever rights the assignor
possessed.'04 The courts affirming standing of health care assignees require that
the assignment be valid and that
the plan does not have an express provision
05
prohibiting such assignments.'
The Seventh Circuit has also upheld the standing of a health care provider as
assignee of benefits, but it has done so on the theory that the provider could show
a "colorable claim" as a beneficiary as defined by ERISA.10 As ERISA defines
a "beneficiary" as "a person designated by a participant . . . who is or may

become entitled to a benefit" under the plan, the court noted that the health care
provider became a beneficiary when designated by the participant in the
assignment agreement.10 7
The Third Circuit has eluded the issue of whether a health care provider has
standing to sue, but has noted in dicta that ERISA's standing provision should be
strictly construed. ° 8 The lower district courts within the Third Circuit have split
on whether assignees have standing to enforce their substantive rights under
ERISA. 109
'o'
789 F.2d 1374, 1378 (9th Cir. 1986).
105

See Kennedy v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 1991) (permitting claims

only where the assignments are in accordance with the terms of the plans); Ark. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield v. St. Mary's Hosp., 947 F.2d 1341, 1345 (8th Cir. 1991) (examining whether a state statute
invalidating a plan provision regarding assignment of benefits was preempted by ERISA);
Davidowitz v. Delta Dental Plan, Inc., 946 F.2d 1476, 1481 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding the plan's
express non-assignment clause); Hermann Hosp. v. MEBA Medical and Benefits Plan, 845 F.2d
1286, 1289 (5th Cir. 1988) (remanding to the district court the issue as to the validity of the
assignment); Home Nutritional Servs., Inc., v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12240, at *4 (D. Mass. Aug. 24, 1993) (discussing concession by plaintiff that nonassignment language in ERISA plans may be enforced against health care providers); Parkside
Lutheran Hosp. v. R.J. Zeltner & Assoc., 788 F. Supp. 1002, 1005 (N.D. Ill 1992) (enforcing the
validity of the plan's anti-assignment clause); Wash. Hosp. Ctr. Corp. v. Group Hospitalization &
Med. Servs., Inc., 758 F. Supp. 750, 755 (D.D.C. 1991) (affirming the validity of an antiassignment clause). But see Lutheran Med. Ctr. v. Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters & Eng'rs.
Health & Welfare Plan, 25 F.3d 616, 619 (8th Cir. 1994) (upholding the plan's anti-assignment
provision but only as to assignment of rights, not to assignment of causes of actions).
See Decatur Mem'l Hosp. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 990 F.2d 925, 927 (7th Cir. 1993)
(holding that an assignee of benefits under an ERISA plan becomes a "statutory" beneficiary with
standing to enforce benefits); Kennedy v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1991)
(finding that the health care assignee was a beneficiary due to the participant's assignment).
107 Kennedy, 924 F.2d at 700 (applying Firestone's "colorable claim" approach for participant

standing to beneficiary standing).
108
See Allstate Ins. Co. v. 65 Sec. Plan, 879 F.2d 90, 94 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting that subrogee lacks
standing to sue under ERISA section 502 and limiting standing to participants and beneficiaries);
N.E. Dep't Ladies' Garment Workers Health & Welfare Fund v. Teamsters Local 229 Welfare
Fund, 764 F.2d 147, 153-54 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that ERISA permits only participants and
beneficiaries to sue, not persons suing on their behalf).
109Compare Allergy Diagnostics Lab. v. Equitable, 785 F. Supp. 523, 527 (W.D. Pa. 1991)
(rejecting standing claims by unenumerated parties under a literal construction of ERISA); Health
Scan, Ltd. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 725 F. Supp. 268, 269 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (relying on Northeast Dept.
ILGWU Health and Welfare Fund v. Teamsters Local Union No. 229, 764 F.2d 147, 154 n.6 (3d
Cir. 1985), to prohibit standing to assignee of plan benefits); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
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Health care plans and insurers on the other side of the fence wishing to
prohibit the assignment of welfare benefits rely on ERISA's preemption clause.
ERISA contains a specific anti-assignment/alienation provision for pension
benefits but is silent regarding the anti-assignment/alienation of welfare
benefits; 1 ° thus, the issue arises as to whether Congress' silence permits
contractual or state-created causes of action or whether such causes of actions are
preempted by ERISA. The Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and District of Columbia
Circuits have enforced the plan's contractual right of anti-assignment of welfare
benefits, but prohibit state's anti-assignment statutes of welfare benefits because
the state statute is preempted under ERISA. 111 What makes these cases so
unusual from a civil procedure aspect is that standing may be created through
contractual terms (a state common law right), especially under welfare plans that
are often unilaterally drafted by the employer, not by both parties; however,
similar state-created standing rights are deemed preempted under ERISA's broad
preemption clause. By allowing ERISA's procedural rules to be dictated by the
explicit plan terms, courts favor the drafter's expertise in lieu of the substantive
rights of the plan participants and beneficiaries.
The proposed patients' bills of rights considered by Congress have not
altered the theory of standing under the ERISA causes of actions noted above;
Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund of Philadelphia & Vicinity, 695 F. Supp. 181, 184 (E.D. Pa.
1988) (citing ILGWU for the proposition that assignees of plan benefits lack standing); Cameron
Manor, Inc. v. Mine Workers, 575 F. Supp. 1243, 1246 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (holding that health care
providers lack standing in their own right); with Charter Fairmount Inst. v. Alta Health Strategies,
835 F. Supp. 233, 238-39 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (accepting the reasoning of several circuit courts and
district courts when finding that an assignee of welfare benefits has standing as beneficiary under
the plan); Children's Hosp. v. 84 Lumber Co. Med. Benefits Plan, 834 F. Supp. 866, 869 (W.D. Pa.
1993) (recognizing the division among the district courts within the third circuit, the court affirms
that the assignee of ERISA benefits is a beneficiary with standing to sue); Penn. Dep't of Pub.
Welfare v. Quaker Med. Care & Survivors Plans, 836 F. Supp. 314, 319 (W.D. Pa. 1993) (granting
standing to the assignee in order to effectuate the statutory pattern of ERISA); Bryn Mawr v.
Coatesville Elec. Supply Co., 776 F. Supp. 181, 184 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (adopting the reasoning of
Albert Einstein Medical Center, 740 F. Supp. at 348-50, and permitting standing for assignee of
ERISA welfare claims); Albert Einstein Med. Ctr. v. Nat'l Benefit Fund for Hosp. & Health Care
Employees, 740 F. Supp. 343, 350 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (accepting the analysis of Misic v. Building
Service Employees Health and Welfare Trust, 789 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1986), and holding that
ERISA welfare benefits are assignable); and Rehabilitation Inst. of Pittsburgh v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, Inc., 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24780, at *20 (W.D. Pa. July 27, 1984) (affirming the theory
that the assignee stands in the shoes of the participant and therefore has standing).
"' See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1994) (limiting assignments of pension plan benefits but silent
regarding welfare plan benefits).
'"See St. Francis Reg. Med. Ctr. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 49 F.3d 1460, 1464-65 (10th Cir.
1995) (holding that the Kansas statute regarding assignability of insurance benefits for ERISA
benefits was preempted); Ark. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary's Hosp., 947 F.2d 1341, 1351
(8th Cir. 1991) (concluding that the Arkansas assignment statute related to the ERISA plan and
therefore was preempted); Davidowitz v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., Inc., 946 F.2d 1476, 1480-81
(9th Cir. 1991) (affirming the express plan provision that prohibited assignments due to Congress'
intent to allow plans such freedom so that "competitive, cost effective, medical expenses reducing
structures as might evolve"); Wash. Hosp. Ctr. Corp. v. Group Hospitalization and Med. Servs.,
Inc., 758 F. Supp. 750, 755 n.5 (D.D.C. 1991) (affirming the insurer's explicit reservation in the
policy to prohibit assignment as consistent with ERISA's public policy).
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however, the bill of rights do vary as to who is an enumerated party under the
newly created ERISA cause of action for failure to exercise ordinary care in the
delivery of health benefits.' 12 The impending DOL regulations likewise do not
attempt to alter standing of any of the enumerated parties under the present
ERISA causes of actions.

D. Subject Matter and Personal Jurisdiction
1. Exclusive vs. Concurrent Jurisdiction
Under the explicit rules of ERISA section 502(e)(1), federal courts are
generally granted exclusive jurisdiction over most ERISA causes of actions,
regardless of the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties.11 3 This
creates the presumption of federal court jurisdiction unless the defendant can
prove concurrent jurisdiction in state court. An exception to exclusive federal
jurisdiction exists for benefit denial claims under ERISA section 502(a)(1) (B),
conferring concurrent jurisdiction to federal and state courts," 14 even though
federal law will govern in either locale.' 15
112See Bipartisan Patient Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 2563, 107th Cong. (2001) (as amended by

numbered 2 and 3 in House Report 107-184); Bipartisan Patient Protection Act of 2001, S. 1052,
107th Cong. (2001). House bill 2563 would exclude treating physicians and hospitals as potential
defendants under the newly created ERISA cause of action; Senate bill 1052 would extend a similar
exclusion to physicians and hospitals, but also excludes employers and plan sponsors provided they
had not engaged in "direct participation."
"' 29 U.S.C. § 1132(t) (1994) (providing the federal courts with jurisdiction for benefit denial
claims without regard to the amount in controversy).
114 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 64 (1987) (quoting H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 931280, at 327 (1974) (providing that the "Conference Report on ERISA describing the civil
enforcement provisions of § 502(a) says ... [w]ith respect to suits to enforce benefit rights under
the plan . . . they may be brought not only in U.S. district courts but also in State courts of
competent jurisdiction")); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 25
(1983) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) when stating that the "statute further states that the district
courts of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions . . . brought by the
Secretary or by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, except for actions by a participant or
beneficiary to recover benefits due"); Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182,
1189 (2d Cir. 1996) (concluding that ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) gives a plan participant or
beneficiary a cause of action "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan," and
ERISA section 502(e)(1) gives state courts and federal district courts concurrent jurisdiction of
actions under section 502(a)(1)(B)); Fuller v. Ulland, 76 F.3d 957, 960 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing
International Ass'n bf Entrepreneurs of America v. Angoff, 58 F.3d 1266, 1271 (8th Cir. 1995)
(finding no need to determine whether federal jurisdiction over the preemption issues exists
because is well established that the state court has concurrent jurisdiction to determine ERISA
status)); Hughes v. Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 264, 267 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that federal
and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) claims);
Barrowclough v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d 923, 936 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing ERISA section
502(e)(1) which provides that "state courts of competent jurisdiction and district courts of the
United States shall have concurrent jurisdiction" over ERISA section 502(a)(l)(B) claims);
Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496, 1500 (9th Cir. 1984) (articulating that
"Congress granted the federal courts jurisdiction, in part exclusive, in part concurrent with state
courts, over matters falling within ERISA's explicit provisions"); Livolsi v. Ram Constr. Co., 728
F.2d 600, 601 (9th Cir. 1984) (concluding that federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction
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Presumably, the theory is that with regards to something so basic as
employee benefit claims, the employee/beneficiary should be granted the
convenience of state or federal court jurisdiction. Claimants obviously may
prefer state courts due to familiarity, length of court calendar, a more sympathetic
forum and procedures, possibility of a jury trial, and general lack of familiarity
with ERISA's technical issues.
As noted earlier, courts generally require that the plaintiffs cause of action
1 16
involve a plan subject to ERISA in order to have subject matter jurisdiction.
The Third Circuit considers the question of whether or not an ERISA plan exists
to be "integral to the merits of a claim" for purposes of ERISA section
502,
17
integral not only to the court's jurisdiction, but also validity of the claim.'
over actions brought under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B)); White v. Enron Corp. Merger Severance
Plan, 686 F. Supp. 582, 583 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (stating that an action brought under section 512 of
ERISA is one in which state courts and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction). The use of
concurrent state jurisdiction presupposes that the case involves the interpretation or application of
the terms of the plan, not an interpretation of the terms of ERISA. See Healey v. Healey, 910 F.
Supp. 249, 251 (E.D.N.C. 1996) (stating that an ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) "may be brought by a
participant or beneficiary... to recover benefits due him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his
rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the
plan"); Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1988) (stating
"we consider the several types of civil suits under ERISA... one such suit is for benefits due under
the terms of the plan which may be brought in either federal or state court"); 1975 Salaried Ret.
Plan for Eligible Employees of Crucible, Inc. v. Nobers, 968 F.2d 401, 406-07 (3d Cir. 1992)
(providing that when a claim "relates to, or implicates construction" of terms under ERISA, federal
jurisdiction over the claim is exclusive), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1086 (1993); Shoefer v. Stuart Hack
Co., 970 F.2d 1316, 1319 (4th Cir. 1992) (determining whether ERISA fiduciary duties existed was
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts); Farrell v. Auto. Club of Mich., 870 F.2d
1129, 1133 (6th Cir. 1989) (concluding that "serious breaches of Defendant's fiduciary duty" as
prescribed under ERISA could be construed as an exclusively federal claim); Chilton v. Savannah
Foods & Indus., 814 F.2 620, 622-23 (lth Cir. 1987) (finding that a claim for eligibility in an
ESOP cannot be remanded to state court); Levy v. Lewis, 635 F.2d 960, 966 (2d Cir. 1980)
(holding that ERISA provided for concurrent federal and state jurisdiction over suits to enforce the
terms of welfare benefit and pension plans, while imposing exclusive federal jurisdiction over other
ERISA claims including those for breach of fiduciary duties).
1l5 See Metro. Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 65 (finding that ERISA's legislative history consistently
sets out a clear intention that section 502(a)(1)(B) suits brought by participants and beneficiaries
are federal questions for the purpose of federal court jurisdiction).
116 See Fuller v. Ulland, 76 F.3d 957, 960 (8th Cir. 1996) (articulating that in order to benefit
from
ERISA preemption it must first establish that the plan is an ERISA-covered plan, fund or program);
United Elec. Radio & Machine Workers v. 163 Pleasant Street Corp., 987 F.2d 39, 48 (1st Cir.
1993) (finding that the district court has personal jurisdiction over claims arising under ERISA);
Bongiomo v. Assoc. in Adolescent Psychiatry, S.C., 17 EBC 1847 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (holding that
since no employee benefit plan was in effect prior to the plaintiffs claim, there is no basis for
invoking federal jurisdiction based on an ERISA plan, and therefore, the ERISA claims will be
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction), summary judgment denied in part, and grantedin
part,appeal dismissed, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18446, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 1994).
117See Henglein v. Informal Plan for Plant Shutdown Benefits for Salaried Employees, 974 F.2d
391, 397-98 (3d Cir. 1992) (concluding that the existence of an employee benefit plan is integral to
the merits of a claim because not only will a claim be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, but the
claim may also be disposed of based on the merits of the case: judgment for defendant because no
benefits were due to the plaintiff because no plan existed), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1036 (1995).
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2. Supplemental Jurisdiction
If the claimant anticipates limited remedies under ERISA's causes of action,
he or she may wish to assert supplemental state causes of action, with more
liberal remedies, preferably adjudicated within the state arena. If the state court
adjudicates both the ERISA benefit denial claim and other state claims, it
certainly has concurrent jurisdiction over the ERISA claim. However, if the
ERISA benefit denial claim and the other state claims are before a federal court,
the issue of supplemental jurisdiction (pendent jurisdiction) arises. Because
ERISA is silent on supplemental jurisdiction, the federal courts have evolved a
general civil procedural rule of supplemental jurisdiction in such contexts."l 8 The
federal courts are permitted to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the related
state law claims, even if the federal claims are later dismissed." 9
Under the proposed patients' bills of rights, ERISA's preemption clause
would be altered only with respect to claims brought under the newly created
ERISA cause of action. 20 The impending DOL regulations, however, do address
the preemptive effect of the claim procedure regulations on state law. The DOL
118 See,

e.g., Finz v. Schlesinger, 957 F.2d 78, 83-84 (2d Cir. 1992) (concluding that a district

court's decision to retain jurisdiction over a pendent state claim, once it had determined the
underlying federal claim was not an abuse of discretion because it would have been inefficient for
the district court not to have addressed the merits of the state law issues), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 822
(1992); S. Council of Indus. Workers v. Ford, 83 F.3d 966, 969 (8th Cir. 1996) (providing that in
any breach of fiduciary duty action where the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district
courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are related to the ERISA
claims that they form part of the same case or controversy); Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach &
Assoc., 903 F.2d 709, 714 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that because the state law claims derived from
the same nucleus of operative facts as the ERISA claim, they were pendent to the ERISA claim,
and the district court had jurisdiction over them irrespective of whether the claims should have
been filed originally in the district court); Sorosky v. Burroughs Corp., 826 F.2d 794, 800 (9th Cir.
1987) (holding that the district court may exercise pendent jurisdiction over state law claims arising
from a nucleus of operative fact common to both the state law claims and the ERISA claim).
119See Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1191-92 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding that because the ERISA claim provided a basis for original jurisdiction, the district court
had the discretion to retain jurisdiction over the plaintiffs supplemental state law claims once it
dismissed the underlying federal claim); S. Council of Indus. Workers, 83 F.3d at 969 (providing
that since it is well established that an ERISA claim is a federal claim, supplemental jurisdiction
exists over state-law claims where, as here, "the federal-law claims and state-law claims in the case
derive from a common nucleus of operative fact and are such that [the plaintiff] would ordinarily be
expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding") (internal quotations omitted); Finz, 957 F.2d at
83 (finding that a district court's decision to retain jurisdiction over a pendent state claim, once it
has determined that the underlying federal claim should be dismissed, is not an abuse of discretion);
Peckham v. Bd. Of Trustees of Int'l Bhd. of Painters and Allied Trades Union, 653 F.2d 424, 428
(10th Cir. 1981) (finding that the plaintiff class had no claim under ERISA because they were not
participants of the ERISA plan, but reversed and remanded the case instructing the district court to
consider related state law claims). See also Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 353
(1988) (setting forth the following four factors in determining in general whether federal courts
should remand supplemental claims: economy, fairness, convenience and comity).
120See Bipartisan Patient Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 2563, 107th Cong. (2001); Bipartisan
Patient Protection Act of 2001 S. 1052, 107th Cong. (2001). The bills vary as to the applicability
of state laws on capping damages for failure to exercise ordinary care in the delivery of health
benefits. See also supra text accompanying note 62.
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states that its regulations do not preempt state insurance laws that impose review
procedures for disputes between patients and health care providers or insurers,
unless the state law prevents their application. 121 Such state insurance laws are
viewed as providing external requirements for dispute resolution, which are not
required by the DOL regulations. However, such state insurance laws may not
require the patient to submit to such outside review
procedures in order to be
122
entitled to file suit for an ERISA cause of action.
E. Removal to Federal District Court
If a plaintiff wishes to assert both an ERISA cause of action and a state case
of action regarding the benefit denial, ERISA's concurrent jurisdiction doctrine
will permit the claimant to pursue the claims in state court, applying federal law
with respect to the ERISA claim and state law with respect to the state claim.
Under the normal rules of federal jurisdiction, a defendant may remove an
ERISA claim and/or state claim properly filed under the state court's concurrent
jurisdiction to federal district court, provided the technical requirements for
removal are met. 123 Such a strategy may be desirable from the defendant's
standpoint due to the court's proximity, longer length of calendar, greater
sophistication with ERISA rules, application of ERISA's deferential judicial
standard of review, and denial of jury trials.
While ERISA's terms are silent on the issue of removal, federal courts have
utilized the general jurisdictional principles to formulate a common law removal
doctrine under ERISA and have adopted the jurisdictional "well-pleaded"
complaint rule. 24 Thus, removal to federal court may be justified only if the
plaintiffs complaint "arises under" federal law and such determination must be
based on "what necessarily appears in the plaintiff's statement of his own claim
...

,

unaided by anything alleged in anticipation of defenses which it is thought

the defendant may interpose. ' 25 Normally, the defendant's reliance on an
ERISA preemption defense to a state complaint will not be automatic grounds for
removal, as such defense is part of the defendant's suit and does not appear on
121See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(k)(1) (2001); Preamble, 65 Fed. Reg. 70,254 (Nov. 21, 2000).
122 See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(k)(2) (2001); Preamble, 65 Fed. Reg. at 70,254 (Nov. 21, 2000).
123 See
24

28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2001) (stating general principles of removal).
1 See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983); Metro.
Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1987); Brown v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 934 F.2d
1193, 1196 (11 th Cir. 1991); Allstate Ins. Co. v. 65 Security Plan, 879 F.2d 90, 93 (3d Cir. 1989).
For a general discussion of the "well-pleaded" complaint rule, see 14 B. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3721 (2d ed.
1997).
125 Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1914) (appearing with favor in FranchiseTax Board of
Cal., 463 U.S. at 10). See also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 127-28
(1974); Danca v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 185 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1999); In re U.S.
Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151, 160 (3d Cir. 1999); Copling v. Container Store, 174 F.3d 590, 594
(5th Cir. 1999); Giles v. NYLCare Health Plans, Inc., 172 F.3d 332, 336 (5th Cir. 1999); Heimann
v. Nat'l Elevator Indus. Pension Fund, 187 F.3d 493, 499 (5th Cir. 1999); Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d
939 (8th Cir. 1999); Lyons v. Alaska Teamsters Employer Serv. Corp., 188 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th
Cir. 1999).
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the face of the plaintiffs complaint. 126 However, the federal courts have
recognized an exception to the "well-pleaded" complaint rule in the ERISA
context if ERISA has so completely preempted state law as to displace state law
jurisdiction. 127 Once completely preempted by federal law, the state claim may
be "recharacterized" as one arising under federal law and thus subject to removal
to federal court. Thus, the issue hinges upon whether the state cause of action
has been completely preempted by federal law (thereby recharacterizing the
action as an ERISA section 502 cause of action with exclusive remedies under
ERISA and permitting removal to federal court), 128 or preempted due to conflict
preemption (which merely displaces the state law and does not afford the basis
for removal to federal court). 129
In the context of a claimant filing in state court solely on a state cause of
action (e.g., a plan participant suing an HMO for negligent medical services in
the delivery of plan benefits), the Supreme Court has extended the "well
pleaded" complaint exception to certain state causes of action because of
ERISA's expansive preemption clause. 13 According to the Court, removal of a
state cause of action to federal court is justified so "that Congress may so
completely pre-empt a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select
group of claims necessarily is federal in character."' 131 While ERISA preemption
does not in and of itself convert a state claim into an action arising under federal
law, removal of a state cause of action to federal court may be permitted because
126 See Rivet v. Regions Bank, 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998) (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1987), and Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 463 U.S. 1 (1983)); Franklin H.
Williams Ins. Trust v. Travelers Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 1995); Dukes v. U.S.
HealthCare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 353-54 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1009 (1995); Warner
v. Ford Motor Co., 46 F.3d 531, 533 (6th Cir. 1995) (overruling Van Camp v. AT&T Information
Systems, 963 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1992)); Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 1995);
Pacificare, Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995); Alexander v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 13
F.3d 940, 94346 n.6 (6th Cir. 1994); Albradco, Inc. v. Bevona, 982 F.2d 82, 85-86 (2d Cir. 1992);
Brown v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 1193, 1196 (11 th Cir. 1991); Eugenia Hosp. v. Kim,
844 F. Supp. 1030, 1031 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
127 See Metro. Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 63-64; Copling v. Container Store, 174 F.3d 590, 594 (5th
Cir. 1999); Giles v. NYLCare Health Plans, Inc., 172 F.3d 332, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1999); Heimann v.
Nat'l Elevator Indus. Pension Fund, 187 F.3d. 493, 499 (5th Cir. 1999); Smith v. Provident Bank,
170 F.3d 609, 613 (6th Cir. 1999); Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 942 (8th Cir. 1999); Lyons v.
Alaska Teamsters Employer Serv. Corp., 188 F.3d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir. 1999); Butero v. Royal
Maccabees Life Ins. Co., 174 F.3d 1207, 1211-12 (11th Cir. 1999); Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc.,
57 F.3d 350, 351-52 (3rd Cir. 1995), cert denied, 516 U.S. 1009 (1995).
128 See Danca v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 185 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1999); In re U.S.
Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151, 160 (3d Cir. 1999); McClelland v. Gronwaldt, 155 F.3d 507, 517
(5th Cir. 1998).
129 See Copling, 174 F.3d at 595; Giles, 172 F.3d at 337; Heimann, 187 F.3d at 499-500; Butero,
174 F.3d at 1212.
130 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1987).
131 Id. The Supreme Court in this decision adopted a complete preemption interpretation of
ERISA's preemption clause which has been extended to permit removal of a wide variety of state
causes of actions. Id. For a general discussion of the "well-pleaded" complaint rule, see 14 B.
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3721 (3d ed. 1997).

HeinOnline -- 70 UMKC L. Rev. 353 2001-2002

UMKC LAW REVIEW

[Vol.70:2

"Congress has clearly manifested an intent to make causes of action within the
scope of the civil enforcement provisions of §502(a) [of ERISA] removable to
federal court. ' 13 2 In deciding ERISA preemption issues, the federal courts have
struggled over the issue of whether the state cause of action in question has been
completely preempted or only preempted under a conflict preemption theory by
ERISA. 13 This is due in part to the Supreme Court's shift away from a
"completion preemption" interpretation of ERISA to a "conflict preemption"
interpretation, 34 as well as the lower courts' struggle to reconcile the recent
Supreme Court preemption cases with the Court's earlier cases, as well as with
their own circuit precedents.
In the context of a suit for benefit claims, the Supreme Court has held that
ERISA preempts any state law breach of contract and tort claims involving the
negligent processing of benefit claims. 135 In addition, courts have affirmed
ERISA's preemption of any state wrongful denial, improper processing, or
misrepresentation or fraud allegation regarding the payment of plan benefits.' 36
132Metro. Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 66.
133See Butero v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co., 174 F.3d 1207, 1212 (l'lth
Cir. 1999) (discussing

the elements of removal under the preemption analysis).
134See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 121 S.Ct. 1322, 1327 (2001) (upholding the preemption of state
regulation of community property law and divorce law; in favor of ERISA's policy of promoting a
uniform administrative scheme); Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 844 (1997); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.
McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 (1990) (affirming the deliberately expansive language of ERISA's
preemption clause to establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern); Pilot Life
Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (interpreting ERISA's preemption clause broadly by
focusing on the phrase relate to and giving it a broad common-sense meaning); Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 (1983) (interpreting ERISA's preemption clause and noting the
"breadth of [514(a)'s] preemptive reach is apparent from that section's language") . But cf De
Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. and Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 813 (1997) (ignoring the
"relate to" language and instead exploring Congress' intent to determine if a state law fell within
ERISAs preemptive scope); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc.,
519 U.S. 316, 335-36 (1997) (rejecting the use of the "relate to" language as a test for preemption,
but instead using it to identify fields of law preempted by ERISA); N.Y. Conference of Blue Cross
& Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995) (upholding a state health care
initiative that assessed surcharges on medical bills of patients on the assumption that the historic
police powers of the states were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank,
510 U.S. 86, 99 (1993) (retreating from a broad interpretation of the phrase "relate to" and instead
focusing on a more traditional preemption analysis, noting that "we discern no solid basis for
believing that Congress, when it designed ERISA, intended fundamentally to alter traditional
preemption analysis").
" See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 47-48 (preempting state claims that "relate to" the ERISA
plan and affirming ERISA's exclusive remedy for allegations of improper claims processing). See
also Beegan v. Assoc. Press, 43 F. Supp. 2d 70, 76 (D. Me. 1999) (holding the plaintiff's breach of
contract claims were preempted by ERISA); Case v. Hosp. of St. Raphael, 38 F. Supp. 2d 207 (D.
Conn. 1999) (affirming that state contractual benefit claims and related tort claims are preempted
by ERISA in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Pilot Life Ins. Co., despite the court's retreat
from the premise).
136 See Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 943 (8th Cir. 1999) (preempting state medical
malpractice
claims), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1189 (2000); Turner v. Fallon Cmty. Health Plan Inc., 127 F.3d 196,
198 (1st Cir. 1997) (preempting a state wrongful death claim, even if the claimant would be without
a remedy), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1512 (1998); Christopher v. Mobil Oil Corp., 950 F.2d 1209,
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The key remaining preemption issue in benefit claim cases is whether state
medical malpractice claims will be deemed preempted under ERISA. 3 7 The
state claims against
highest courts of New York and Pennsylvania have preserved
38
an HMO or its physicians in medical malpractice suits.1
A defendant in any ERISA benefit denial claim case will certainly request
removal to federal court on the theory that any related state cause of action has
been completely preempted by ERISA. Such result may indeed become outcome
determinative in favor of the defendant due to the federal courts' limited judicial
review and limitations on remedies for ERISA claims benefit payments. In
effect, remedies under state causes of action are bypassed as a result of the
defendant's reliance upon ERISA's preemption clause.
The recent proposed patients' bill of rights attempts to alter the courts'
removal doctrine. The House version permits removal to federal court for suits
against the employer, but provides state court access for suits against health
insurers. 39 The bill would also affect removal since it would alter ERISA's
preemption clause to permit certain state laws affording protections to patients in
the health care system. 40 The impending DOL regulations are silent on the
courts' removal doctrine; however, the regulations specify that if a claimant
court, in lieu of federal court, state law
initiates a cause of action in state
14
1
exhausted.
be
not
need
procedures

F. Venue
Regarding the choice of federal district court in which an ERISA section
502(a) cause of action may be brought, ERISA's legislative language adopts a
pro-participant/beneficiary policy and provides a liberal choice of venue so as to
Venue lies in any federal district court
provide ready access to federal courts.
1218 (5th Cir. 1992) (preempting wrongful discharge by fraud and negligent misrepresentation
claims).
137 The Supreme Court has granted certiorariin Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., v. Moran, 230 F.3d
959 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S.Ct. 2589 (2001), to consider whether state laws that
subject the decisions for health treatment under managed-care arrangements to independent review
are preempted under ERISA. While the case involves Illinois law, thirty-seven states and the
District of Columbia have similar independent review requirements. Id.
138 See Nealy v. US Healthcare HMO, 711 N.E.2d 621, 624-26 (N.Y. 1999) (upholding traditional
regulation of states over medical malpractice claims); Pappas v. Asbel, 724 A.2d 889, 893-94 (Pa.
1998) (holding that state regulation of negligence laws against health care providers does not relate
to an ERISA plan).
139 See Bipartisan Patient Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 2563, 107th Cong. (2001) (as amended by
numbered 2 and 3 in House Report 107-184); Bipartisan Patient Protection Act of 2001, S. 1052,
107th Cong. (2001).
140 See H.R. 2563 (as amended by numbered 2 and 3 in House Report 107-184); S. 1052.
141 See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(k)(2)(ii) (2001). Given that ERISA section 514 does not
specifically authorize the DOL to initiate regulations under that section, it is questionable that the
DOL's regulatory power can extend this far. Id.
142 See Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 809 F.2d 1520, 1524 (11 th Cir. 1987); Varsic v. United States
District Court for the Cent. Dist., 607 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1979); I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund v.
Wakefield Ind., 699 F.2d 1254, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Higgins v. Exxon Co., USA, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19798 (D. Conn. July 30, 1998); Dittman v. Dyno Nobel, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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in which the plan is administered, where the fiduciary breach took place, or
where at least one defendant resides or may be found. 143 Such provisions provide
the plaintiff with several forums and an opportunity to "forum shop,"' 44 but only
within the federal district courts and not any state courts. A defendant wishing to
request a transfer of venue must abide with the general jurisdiction rules of 28
U.S.C. § 1404. 14 The existing patients' bill of rights and impending DOL
regulations are silent on the issue of venue.

G. Statute of Limitations
While ERISA contains explicit statutes of limitations for various types of
violations (e.g., violations of plan claims, fiduciary violations, prohibited
transaction restrictions, etc.), 146 there is no explicit statute of limitations for
benefit claim cases. Most courts have incorporated the forum state's most
analogous statute of limitation, generally using the state's statute of limitations
for written contract actions. 147 Others have used the state's statute of limitations
19392 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1998); Keating v. Whitmore Mfg. Co., 981 F. Supp. 890, 892 (E.D. Pa.
1997); Cent. States, S.E. and S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Salasnek Fisheries, Inc., 977 F. Supp.
888, 890-91 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Seitz v. Bd. of Trs. of the Pension Plan, 953 F. Supp. 100, 102
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); Foster G. McGaw Hosp. v. Int'l Ass'n Machinists No. 9 Welfare Tr., 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16194 (N.D. I1.
Oct. 22, 1992); HEREIU Welfare Pension Fund v. Amivest Corp.,
733 F. Supp. 1180, 1182 (N.D. Ill. 1990); McFarland v. Yegen, 699 F. Supp. 10, 12 (D.N.H. 1988);
Ballinger v. Perkins, 515 F. Supp. 673, 675 (W.D. Va. 1981).
143 29 U.S.C. § 1 132(e)(2)
(2001).
144See Wallace v. Am. Petrofina, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 829, 832 (E.D.Tex. 1987) (willing to extend
venue to the place where the breach occurred); Foster G. McGaw Hosp., 1992 U.S.Dist. LEXIS
16194; Doe v. Connors, 796 F.Supp. 214, 222 (W.D. Va. 1992). But see Orgeron v. Moran Towing
Corp., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13840 (E.D. La. Sept. 22, 1994) (denying venue in the district where
the plaintiff resides as the plan was not administered there and the breach did not occur there);
McFarland,699 F. Supp. at 14 (requiring sufficient minimum contacts to establish forum).
145
See Cargill Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 920 F. Supp. 144, 148 (D. Colo. 1996); Nat'l Automatic
Sprinkler Ind. Fund. v. Delta Automatic Sys., Inc. 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10958 (D. Md. July 22,
1992); Doe, 796 F. Supp. at 221-22; NGS Am., Inc. v. Barnes, 782 F. Supp. 1198, 1200-01 (E.D.
Mich. 1992); McFarland,699 F. Supp. at 13-14; Trs. of Chicago Truck Drivers Pension Fund. v.
Am. Carriers, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2337 (N.D. I11.
Mar. 7, 1989); Laborers Nat'l Pension Fund
v. Tudor Constr. Co., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6760 (E.D. La. June 9, 1989); U.S. Telecom, Inc., v.
Hubert,
678 F. Supp. 1500, 1504-05 (D. Kan. 1987).
14 6 29 U.S.C. § 1113 (2001).
147See Hall v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 105 F.3d 225, 230 (5th Cir. 1997) (using Louisiana's 10-year
statute of limitation for personal actions); Daill v. Sheet Metal Workers' Local 73 Pension Fund,
100 F.3d 62, 65 (7th Cir. 1996) (using Illinois'ten-year statute of limitations for contract actions);
Flanagan v. Inland Empire Elec. Workers Pension Plan & Trust, 3 F.3d 1246, 1252 (9th Cir. 1993)
(using Washington's six-year statute of limitations for contract actions); Gluck v. Unisys Corp.,
960 F.2d 1168, 1181 (3d Cir. 1992) (using Pennsylvania's four-year statute for anticipatory breach
of contract claims); Hogan v. Kraft Foods, 969 F.2d 142, 145 (5th Cir. 1992) (using Texas' fouryear statute of limitations for contract actions); Meade v. Pension Appeals & Review Comm., 966
F.2d 190, 193-96 (6th Cir. 1992) (using Ohio's fifteen-year statute of limitations); Schroeder v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 970 F.2d 419, 420 (8th Cir. 1992) (using Nebraska's five-year statute of
limitation for contract actions); Johnson v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 942 F.2d 1260, 1263-66
(8th Cir. 1991) (using Missouri's ten-year statute of limitation for contract actions); Wright v. S.W.
Bell Tel. Co., 925 F.2d 1288, 1291 (10th Cir. 1991) (using Oklahoma's five-year statute of
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for actions involving recovery of wages or breach of employment contract. 148 In
cases where the plan specifies its choice of applicable state law, courts still favor
the forum state's statute of limitation over the plan's "governing law"
provision. 149
While some courts have recognized that the plan may impose a shorter
statute of limitations, 150 they distinguish between the length of the statute of
limitations and the determination of when a claim for relief accrues. The latter
issue is regarded as a question of federal law. 151 Thus, courts will not routinely
enforce a plan limitation which attempts to specify when the claim accrues.
As to the issue of when a claim for relief under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B)
accrues, the majority of circuit courts generally agree that accrual begins when a
formal and final denial of benefits under the plan's claims procedure has
occurred. 15 3 Such consensus of opinion made sense under the initial DOL claim
limitations for contract actions); Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Weitz, 913 F.2d 1544, 1551 n.12
(11 th Cir. 1990) (using Alabama's six-year statute of limitation for contract actions); Dameron v.
Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 815 F.2d 975, 981 (4th Cir. 1987) (using Maryland's three-year
statute of limitations for contract actions); Miles v. N.Y. Teamsters Conference Pension & Ret.
Fund Employee Pension Benefit Plan, 698 F.2d 593, 598 (2d Cir. 1983) (using New York's sixyear statute of limitation for contract actions), cert denied, 464 U.S. 829 (1983); Schendel v. Pipe
Trades Dist. Council No. 36 Pension Plan, 880 F. Supp. 710, 714 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (using
California's four-year statue of limitation for contract actions); Wise v. Dallas & Mavis Forwarding
Co., 753 F. Supp. 601, 606 (W.D.N.C. 1991) (using North Carolina's three-year statute of
limitations for contract law).
148 See Adamson v. Armco, Inc., 44 F.3d 650, 652-53 (8th Cir. 1995) (using Minnesota's two-year
limitation for claims for wages and fringe benefits); Gluck, 960 F.2d at 1181 (using Pennsylvania's
three-year statute of limitations under wage law for benefits in pay status); Vernau v. Vic's Mkt.,
896 F.2d 43, 47 (3d Cir. 1990) (using Pennsylvania's three-year statute of limitations for wage
law); Gray v. Greyhound Ret. & Disability Trust, 730 F. Supp. 415, 419 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (using
Florida's two-year statute of limitation for recovery of wages).
149 See Gluck, 960 F.2d at 1179-80; Champion Int'l. Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 779
F.2d 328, 332-34 (6th Cir. 1985).
150 See Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 112 F.3d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 1997); Payne v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 976 F.2d 727 (4th Cir. 1992); Bomis v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 970 F. Supp.
584, 588 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Patterson-Priori v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 846 F. Supp. 1102,
1105 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Lugo v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 852 F. Supp. 187, 194-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1994);
Chilcote v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 841 F. Supp. 877, 879-80 (E.D. Wis. 1993); Koonan
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 802 F. Supp. 1424, 1425 (E.D.Va. 1992); Roberson v. Metro. Life
Ins. Co., 682 F. Supp. 907, 909 (E.D. Mich. 1988). But see Davis v. NMU Pension & Welfare
Plan, 810 F. Supp. 532, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (refusing to enforce the plan's shortened period
because the summary plan description containing the limitation had not been sent to the claimant).
151 See Mich. United Food and Commercial Workers Unions v. Muir Co., 992 F.2d 594, 598 (6th
Cir. 1993); DailU, 100 F.3d at 65; Price v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 2 F.3d 986, 988 (9th
Cir. 1993); Tolle v. Carroll Touch, Inc., 977 F.2d 1129, 1138 (7th Cir. 1992); Connors v. Hallmark
& Son Coal Co., 935 F.2d 336, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1991); N. Cal. Retail Clerks Union, & Food
Employers Joint Pension Trust v. Jumbo Mkts., 906 F.2d 1371, 1372 (9th Cir. 1990); Ingram v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 897 F. Supp. 1160, 1164 (N.D. Ind. 1995); Smith v. Rochester Tel. Bus. Mktg.
Corp, 786 F. Supp. 293, 306 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
152 See Wetzel v. Lou Ehlers Cadillac Group Long Term Disability Ins. Program, 222 F.3d 643 (9th
Cir. 2000).
153 See Hogan, 969 F.2d at 145; Stevens v. Employer-Teamsters Joint Council No. 84 Pension
Fund, 979 F.2d 444, 451 (6th Cir. 1992); Tolle, 977 F.2d at 1139; Larsen v. NMU Pension Trust,
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procedure regulations which required a claimant's compliance only if the plan's
review procedures were reasonable.'54 Whether or not a claim had been properly
filed was relevant as a failure to comply with certain aspects (e.g., notification of
denial to the claimant) and rendered the claim denied, thereby permitting the
claimant to proceed to the next stage of the review process.155 Thus, a variety 1of
56
court cases exist focusing on the reasonableness of a given plan's procedures.
The impending DOL regulations eliminate the express requirement of filing a
benefit request and permit the claimant to proceed directly to litigation,
bypassing the internal claims 5rocedures, if the plan fails to comply with any and
all aspects of the regulations.57 Such result is in direct conflict with the judicial
doctrine of exhaustion that will be discussed next in the article.
The proposed patients' bill of rights make no amendments to alter ERISA
section 413.

H. Exhaustion of the Plan's Internal Claims Procedures
1. The Courts' Doctrine of Exhaustion and its Exceptions
Due to the silence of ERISA and the DOL regulations (at least for the first
twenty-six years after ERISA's passage) on the issue of exhaustion of internal
claims procedures prior to litigation, the federal courts developed an exhaustion58
of administrative remedies doctrine in the ERISA benefit denial contexts.
902 F.2d 1069, 1073 (2d Cir. 1990); Cotter v. E. Conference of Teamsters Ret. Plan, 898 F.2d 424,
428-29 (4th Cir. 1990); Simmons v. Willcox, 911 F.2d 1077, 1081 (5th Cir. 1990); Menhom v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496, 1501 (9th Cir. 1984); Miles, 698 F.2d at 598; Jenkins
v. Local 705 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Pension Plan, 713 F.2d 247, 254 (7th Cir. 1983); Paris v.
Profit Sharing Plan For Employees of Howard B. Wolf, Inc., 637 F.2d 357, 361 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 836 (1981); Schendel v. Pipe Trades Dist. Council No. 36 Pension Plan, 880
F. Supp. 710, 714 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Hemphill v. Unisys Corp., 855 F. Supp. 1225, 1234 (D. Utah
1994); Gray v. Greyhound Ret. & Disability Trust, 730 F. Supp. 415, 417-18 (M.D. Fla. 1990).
54 See 29 C.F.R. § 2503-1(d) (2001).
155 See 29 C.F.R. §§ 2503-1(f), (e) (2001).
156 See Jurash v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4479 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2000);
Hutzenlaub v. Local 240 Pension Fund, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21245 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2000);
Birdsell v. U.P.S., 94 F.3d 1130, 1133 (8th Cir. 1996); Bali v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, 873
F.2d 1043, 1048 (7th Cir. 1989). See also Schadler v. Anthem Life Ins. Co., 147 F.3d 388, 395
(5th Cir. 1998) (requiring as a basis for the reasonableness requirements,
the end product of a claims review process wherein § 1133 and its regulations
have been followed faithfully is a benefits decision that is thoroughly informed
by the relevant facts and the terms of the plan and, if benefits are denied,
includes an explanation of the denial that is adequate to insure meaningful
review of that denial).
117 See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-10) (2001).
158While ERISA has no express provision requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to
suit, the courts have imposed a judicially required mandate in order to bring a civil action for
benefits. See Ravencraft v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 212 F.3d 341, 343 (6th Cir. 2000); Perrino v. S.
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 209 F.3d 1309, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000); Schleeper v. Purina Benefits Ass'n,
170 F.3d 1157, 1158 (8th Cir. 1999); Layes v. Mead Corp., 132 F.3d 1246, 1252 (8th Cir. 1998);
McGraw v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 137 F.3d 1253, 1263-64 (10th Cir. 1998); Hall v. Nat'l
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Focusing on language from ERISA's congressional conference committee that
the enforcement provision should be fashioned in a manner similar to those under
section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act 1947 (LMRA) which
requires claimants to exhaust grievance procedures prior to litigation, courts have
used labor principles in fashioning such an exhaustion doctrine.' 59
The public policy behind the use of such an exhaustion doctrine has been
best enunciated by the Ninth Circuit in Amato v. Bernard.160 In Amato, the court
praised the doctrine's ability to prevent "premature judicial intervention;" to
permit the plan administrator to assemble evidence and factual record explaining
their reasoning process and to apply their expertise and discretion in managing
the plan's funds, correcting errors and interpreting ambiguous plan provisions;
16
and to avoid litigating disputes that may be resolved at the administrative level. 1
Gypsum Co., 105 F.3d 225, 231-32 (5th Cir. 1997); Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 112
F.3d 869, 873 (7th Cir. 1997); Kinkead v. S.W. Bell Corp. Sickness & Accident Disability Benefit
Plan, 111 F.3d 67, 69-70 (8th Cir. 1997); Lindemann v. Mobil Oil Corp., 79 F.3d 647, 649 (7th Cir.
1996); Sarraf v. Standard Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 1996); Communications Workers of
Am. v. AT&T, 40 F.3d 426, 431-32 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Rodriguez-Abreu v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A., 986 F.2d 580, 583 (1st Cir. 1993); Kennedy v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 989 F.2d
588, 592-93 (2d Cir. 1993); Berger v. Edgewater Steel Co., 911 F.2d 911, 916 (3d Cir. 1990);
Simmons v. Willcox, 911 F.2d 1077, 1081 (5th Cir. 1990); Makar v. Health Care Corp., 872 F.2d
80, 82 (4th Cir. 1989); Drinkwater v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821, 826 (1st Cir. 1988);
Alfarone v. Bernie Wolff Constr. Corp., 788 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1986). Where the protected rights
are statutory (e.g., breach of fiduciary duty, discrimination in violation of ERISA section 510,
disclosure violations), the courts do not necessarily impose an exhaustion of the plan's internal
procedures. See Held v. Mfrs. Hanover Leasing Corp., 912 F.2d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir. 1990)
(holding exhaustion is not necessary prior to bringing an ERISA section 510 cause of action); Zipf
v. AT&T, 799 F.2d 889, 891-93 (3d Cir. 1986) (limiting exhaustion to benefit claims cases, not
statutory violations, because plan fiduciaries lack the expertise to interpret statutes); Amaro v.
Cont'l Can Co., 724 F.2d 747, 750-53 (9th Cir. 1984) (interpreting ERISA section 510 is a
judiciary task, not one involving plan administrators, and thus no requirement to exhaust
administrative procedures); but see Kross v. W. Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1244-45 (7th Cir. 1983)
(holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in requiring exhaustion in an ERISA
section 510 complaint); Mason v. Cont'l Group, Inc., 763 F. 2d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 1985)
(enumerating compelling reasons for requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies for statutory
ERISA violations).
159 See Makar v. Health Care Corp. of the Mid-Atlantic, 872 F.2d 80, 82 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting
that though
ERISA does not contain an explicit exhaustion provision[,] . . . an ERISA

claimant generally is required to exhaust the remedies provided by the
employee benefit plan in which he participates as a prerequisite to an ERISA
action for denial of benefits under [ERISA section 502]. This exhaustion
requirement rests upon the Act's text and structure as well as the strong federal
interest encouraging private resolution of ERISA disputes.).
See also, Wolf v. Nat'l Shopmen Pension Fund, 728 F.2d 182, 186 (3d Cir. 1984); Denton v. First
Nat'l Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1300-01 (5th Cir. 1985); Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 566 (9th Cir.
1980); Communications Workers of Am. v. AT&T, 40 F.3d 426,431-33 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
'60 618 F.2d at 566 (9th Cir. 1980) (relying on the legislative history in H.R. REP. No. 1280,
reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5107).
161 Id. For case law supporting the Amato reasoning, see Communications Workers of Am. v.
AT&T, 40 F.3d 426, 431-33 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Kennedy v. Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 989
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Later, the Fifth Circuit elaborated upon these primary concerns and included
other goals: the fulfillment of Congress' desire to have the plan's designated
fiduciary, not the courts, administer the plans for which they are liable; the
fashioning of an administrative record for the courts' review if necessary; and the
use of a deferential, not de novo, judicial standard of review of the fiduciary's
decision. 162 Other courts have noted that the use of the exhaustion doctrine
fostered additional public interests including encouragement of private resolution
of ERISA claims, reduction of plan costs, better use of plan funds by using the
internal plan procedures before premature judicial interference, opportunity
afforded to plan administrators to correct errors and to promote the consistent
treatment of the denial of claims, and the163opportunity to assemble a factual record
for the court's review if later necessary.
F.2d 588, 592-93 (2d Cir. 1993); Powell v. AT&T Communications, Inc., 938 F.2d 823, 826 (7th
Cir. 1991). See also Diaz v. United Agric. Employee Welfare Benefit Plan & Trust, 50 F.3d 1478,
1483 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting the following policy reasons for support of the exhaustion doctrine:
"the reduction of frivolous litigation, the promotion of consistent treatment of claims, the provision
of a nonadversial method of claims settlement, the minimization of costs of claim settlement and a
proper
reliance on administrative expertise").
62
See Denton v. First Nat'l Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1300-01 (5th Cir. 1985) (affirming the Amato
court's requirement of exhaustion by stating
[t]he Amato court required benefit claimants to exhaust their administrative
remedies prior to seeking federal court review of a benefit denial. The court
based its decision on an examination of the legislative history of ERISA which
clearly suggested that Congress intended to grant authority to the courts to
apply the exhaustion doctrine in suits arising under the Act. The Amato court
stressed that the literal language and policies of ERISA require benefit Plans to
provide administrative remedies to persons whose benefits had been denied.
Also important to the court was Congress' intention to grant trustees the broad
managerial discretion necessary to establish and operate ERISA qualified
pension Plans ... [t]hus, Congress' ERISA fiduciary framework mandates the
exhaustion requirement.
(internal quotations omitted)).
163 See Costantino v. TRW, Inc., 13 F.3d 969, 975 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that exhaustion promotes
the public policy of encouraging private resolution of disputes under ERISA); Wilczynski v.
Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 93 F.3d 397, 402 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Powell, 983 F.2d at 825, for
the proposition that exhaustion promotes the policy reason of allowing the plan fiduciary to
exercise its expertise and to efficiently manage the administration of the plan, as well as the
promotion of consistent treatment of claims; use of a nonadversial dispute resolution process; and
reduction in both plan costs and time allotment for claim settlement); Taylor v. Bakery &
Confectionary Union & Indus. Int'l Welfare Fund, 455 F. Supp. 816, 820 (E.D.N.C. 1978)
(focusing on the cost savings rationale for having an exhaustion policy, noting that
[i]f claimants were allowed to litigate the validity of their claims before a final
trustee decision was rendered, the costs of dispute settlement would increase
markedly for employers. Employees would also suffer financially because,
rather than utilize a simple procedure which allows them to deal directly with
their employer, they would have to employ an attorney and bear the costs of
adversary litigation in the courts.);
Brown v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 589 F. Supp. 64, 68 (S.D. Ga. 1984) (holding that exhaustion of
administrative remedies promotes the development of a factual record for judicial review and
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Due to the pervasive policy reasons supporting the exhaustion of
administrative remedies, all the circuits require the claimant to exhaust
administrative procedures prior to litigating an ERISA benefits claim.164 Aside
from ERISA's compelling legislative history on this issue, the courts' use of the
exhaustion doctrine in benefit denial cases is also consistent with the general
principles of judicial rule-making which require a case or controversy to be
"ripe" for adjudication, favoring the use of administrative remedies prior to the
intervention by the Courts. 16 5 If the claimant has failed to exhaust the internal
plan administrative remedies, the federal courts will not consider the merits of
the claim.166 Some courts render a summary judgment, whereas other courts
remand the claim for reconsideration by the plan administrator, suspending the
court action until the internal claims procedures had been completed. 67 Less
frequently, the courts have dismissed a claim with prejudice because the claimant
missed the plan's sixty day or more frame for requesting review. 168 In certain
instances, the court has barred the claimant who ignored the benefit denial
upholds Congress' intent that the management and administration of ERISA plans remains with the
trustees). For a full description of the federal courts' ERISA exhaustion theory, see Thomas J.
Griffith and J.G. Payton, Exhaustion of Internal Remedies, BUSINESS LAWS, INC., 115 Supp. 6
(August 1999).
164 See Layes v. Mead Corp., 132 F.3d 1246, 1252 (8th Cir. 1998); McGraw v. Prudential Ins. Co.
of Am., 137 F.3d 1253, 1263-64 (10th Cir. 1998); Counts v. Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co.,
111 F.3d 105, 108 (11th Cir. 1997); Hickey v. Digital Equip. Corp., 43 F.3d 941, 945 (4th Cir.
1995); Communications Workers of Am. v. AT&T, 40 F.3d 426, 431-32 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Medina
v. Anthem Life Ins. Co., 983 F.2d 29, 33 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 816 (1993); Baxter
v. C.A. Muer Corp., 941 F.2d 451, 454 (6th Cir. 1991); Berger v. Edgewater Steel Co., 911 F.2d
911, 916 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 920 (1991); Drinkwater v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 846
F.2d 821, 825-26 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988); Alfarone v. Bernie Wolff
Constr. Corp., 788 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 915 (1986); Amato v.
Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 566 (9th Cir. 1980).
165 See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967) (limiting judicial review to that of the
administrator's action, absent "clear and convincing evidence of a contrary legislative intent"). See
also 13A CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3532 (1984) (explaining that the judicial doctrine of "ripeness" favors judicial
economy by postponing judicial review until administrative avenues have been utilized).
166 See Berger, 911 F°2d at 916 (stating that the exhaustion requirement will be "strictly enforced");
Weldon v. Kraft, Inc., 896 F.2d 793, 800 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Except in limited circumstances ... , a
federal court will not entertain an ERISA claim unless the plaintiff has exhausted the remedies
available under the plan.").
167 See Schadler v. Anthem Life Ins. Co., 147 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 1998) (remanding the matter
to the plan administrator for development of a full factual record); Smith v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield United, 959 F.2d 655, 658-59 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming the district court's use of summary
judgment); Makar v. Health Care Corp. (Carefirst), 872 F.2d 80, 82-83 (4th Cir. 1989) (remanding
the case due to "strong federal interest" in exhaustion); Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 566 (9th
Cir.
1980) (affirming the district court's use of summary judgment).
168 See Baxter v. C.A. Muer Corp., 941 F.2d 451, 453-54 (6th Cir. 1991) (dismissing with prejudice
as the claimant failed to exhaust internal procedures within 90 days); Greathouse v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 750 F. Supp. 225, 226 (E.D.Tex. 1990) (dismissing the case with prejudice where estate
executrix failed to exhaust after being ordered to do so); Gray v. Dow Chem. Co., 615 F. Supp.
1040,1044-45 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (one claim time-barred due to expiration of timeframe for filing
request for review), aff'd, 791 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1986).
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process any judicial review. 169 Due to a plan's time frame (e.g., sixty days) for
filing for review of a benefits claim and the importance of exhaustion of such
administrative remedies, failure to heed the plan's time-table may delay or bar
judicial review of a claim. The scope of the exhaustion doctrine, however, does
not extend to additional issues or theories,
thereby permitting the claimant to
170
raise such issues or theories later at trial.
The courts have developed several logical exceptions to the exhaustion
171
doctrine: (1) where meaningful access to the review procedures is unavailable,
2
(2)
access ofto irreparable
the review procedures
would
futile, 1 was
or
(3) where
where meaningful
there is danger
harm. 173 The
firstprove
exception
169See Wolf v. Nat'l Shopmen Pension Fund, 728 F.2d 182, 186 (3d Cir. 1984) (limiting ERISA

section 502(a) to require only claim exhaustion, not issue or theory exhaustion); Tiger v. AT&T
Tech. Plan for Employees' Pension, Disability Benefits, 633 F. Supp. 532, 534 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)
(precluding judicial review for failure to pursue administrative remedies within the plan's time
frame); Taylor v. S. Cent. Bell, 422 So. 2d 528, 529 (La. App. 1982) (barring judicial relief for
failure to pursue and exhaust administrative remedies).
170 See Wolf, 728 F.2d at 186 (holding that ERISA's exhaustion doctrine extends to only claims
exhaustion, not issue or theory exhaustion); Jenkins v. Local 705 Int'l Bhd. of Teamster Pension
Plan, 713 F.2d 247, 254 (7th Cir. 1983) (permitting consideration of both the claimant's old and
new claim for early retirement benefits).
171 See Lee v. Cal. Butchers' Pension Trust Fund, 154 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that
"when a plan's review apparatus has been abolished there is no need for a claimant to go through
the formalities"); Hall v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 105 F.3d 225, 232 (5th Cir. 1997) (denying
meaningful access to appeal procedures does not require exhaustion); Wilczynski v. Lumbermens
Mut. Cas. Co., 93 F.3d 397, 402-04 (7th Cir. 1996) (permitting an exception to the exhaustion
requirement where the plaintiff was denied meaningful access); Conley v. Pitney Bowes, 34 F.3d
714, 718-19 (8th Cir. 1994) (waiving exhaustion requirement due to employer's failure to notify the
employee of the appeal procedures); Curry v. Contract Fabricators Inc. Profit Sharing Plan, 891
F.2d 842, 846-47 (11th Cir. 1990) (permitting an exception to the exhaustion doctrine where the
plaintiff was denied meaningfulaccess to the appeals procedure) But cf. McKenzie v. Gen. Tel.
Co., 41 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that failure to provide the summary plan
description to the claimant who was familiar with the standards does not waive the exhaustion
requirement), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1066 (1995); Heller v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co, 142 F.3d 487,
493 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (denying summary judgment due to substantial compliance with the claims
procedure requirements), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 930 (1998); Wilczynski v. Kemper Nat'l Ins. Co.,
998 F. Supp. 931, 944 (N.D. I11.
1998) (requiring claimant to exhaust administrative remedies even
though the company's review procedure exhibited some procedural defects, they were as a whole in
compliance with the statutory requirements).
172 See McGraw v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 137 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998) (recognizing
the futility exception); Costantino v. TRW, Inc., 13 F.3d 969, 974 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting the
exception to traditional exhaustion principles "when resort to the administrative route is futile");
Smith v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 959 F.2d 655, 658-59 (7th Cir. 1992) (recognizing the
futility exception to the exhaustion doctrine, though holding that the futility exception did not apply
to the plaintiffs in the case); Riggs v. A.J. Ballard Tire & Oil Co., 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 31134, at
*5 (9th Cir. Nov. 19, 1992) (failing to exhaust is excused if it would be futile); Horan v. Kaiser
Steel Ret. Plan, 947 F.2d 1412, 1416 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming the district court's discretion to
waive exhaustion when to do so would be futile); Berger v. Edgewater Steel Co., 911 F.2d 911,916
(3d Cir. 1990) (recognizing futility as an exception to the use of the exhaustion doctrine), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 920 (1991); O'Bryhim v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 997 F. Supp. 728, 731
(E.D. Va. 1998) (permitting judicial review upon a "clear and positive" showing of futility).
173See generally Turner v. Fallon Cmty. Unity Health Plan, Inc., 127 F.3d 196, 200 (1st Cir. 1997)
(stating "a failure to exhaust is easily forgiven for good reason, and no reason is better than an
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fashioned by the Eleventh Circuit in Curry v. Contract FabricatorsInc. Profit
Sharing Plan,174 in which case the plan or plan fiduciary withheld necessary
documents and its reasons for denying the claim. Because the plan fiduciary
controlled the administrative review process and denied the claimant access to
such process, the court deemed it pointless to require the claimant to exhaust the
very procedures that were denied to him. 75 Courts have extended this exception
to other similar situations (e.g., where the claimant was not notified of the
1 76
appeals procedures or was refused the opportunity to participate in the review;
where the plan fiduciary misled the claimant about benefit payments from
medical providers and failed to share information with the claimant; 177 and where
the plaintiff had completed the'traditional two-step review process but wish to
bypass the
third level of review because" she had no additional information to
178
supply).

Courts have developed another exception to the exhaustion requirement
when proceeding with the review process would be "clearly useless ' ' 17 9 or
"futile" 80 (e.g., claimant told prior to review process that the decision would not
be changed). In the case landmark case Fallick v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Co., rendered by the Sixth Circuit, the plaintiff had established futility by
imminent threat to life or health"), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1072 (1998); Henderson v. Bodine
Aluminum, Inc., 70 F.3d 958, 961 (8th Cir. 1995) (concluding that exhaustion of administrative
remedies was not required since missing treatment coupled with the plaintiff's grave illness
constitute irreparable harm); Wilson v. Globe Specialty Prods., Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 92, 99 (D.
Mass. 2000) (excusing the requirement of exhaustion in the context of irreparable harm); Watts v.
Organogenesis, Inc. 30 F. Supp. 2d 101, 104 (D. Mass. 1998) (quoting Turner, 127 F.3d at 200).
174 891 F.2d 842 (11 th Cir. 1990).
175Id. at 846-47 ("When a plan administrator in control of the available review procedures denies a
claimant meaningful access to those procedures, the district court has discretion not to require
exhaustion.").
176 See Conley v. Pitney Bowes, 34 F.3d 714, 718 (8th Cir. 1994); Novak v. TRW, Inc. 822 F.
Supp. 963, 969 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (waiving exhaustion requirement where the claimant was not
informed of his administrative remedies); Clay v. ILC Data Device Corp., 771 F. Supp. 40, 45
(E.D.N.Y. 1991) (dismissing exhaustion as defense the plan never informed the claimant of his
administrative remedies).
177 See Bowerman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 226 F.3d 574, 586-87 (7th Cir. 2000) (using equitable
estoppel principles to preclude the assertion of exhaustion due to the plan administrator's
misrepresentation to the claimant); Burris v. IASD Health Servs. Corp., 19 EBC 2680 (S.D. Iowa
1995).
178 Hager v. NationsBank, N.A. 167 F.3d 245 (5th Cir. 1999).
179 McGraw v. Prudential Ins. Co., 137 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that "a
claimant must make a clear and positive showing of futility" as an excuse for not exhausting
administrative remedies (internal quotations omitted)).
180 See Corsini v. United Healthcare Corp. 965 F. Supp. 265, 269 (D.R.I. 1997); Harrow v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 76 F. Supp. 2d 558, 562 (D.N.J. 1999). Similar to the use of the
estoppel theory for the first exception to the meaningful access requirements, two circuits have
used an alternative rationale to the futility exception by allowing the claimant to advance the
argument that the administrative appeals process provides an "inadequate remedy." Cf Perrino v.
S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 209 F,3d 1309, 1315-16 (11th Cir. 2000) (adding that the exhaustion
requirement should be excused where the administrative remedies are inadequate); McGraw, 137
F.3d at 1263 (stating that the district courts have excused exhaustion when the remedy provided is
inadequate).
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showing that the defendant insurance company had engaged in a two-year
discussion with the plaintiff regarding the methodology of calculating reasonable
and customary charges and made no attempt to "seriously reconsider" such
methodology.18 1 In finding the futility of pursuing such internal procedures, the
court mentioned the following factors: (1) exhaustion would be costly to the
plaintiff class and defendant due to litigation fees, (2) the defendant made no
attempt to reconsider the methodology used for processing claims, and (3) the
factual record had already been well established.' 8
Most courts require that the claimant actually present clear and accurate
proof of the futility of the appeal, and not merely rely upon the claimant's
allegation. 183 The fact that the internal appellate reviewer is the same entity or
person as the initial internal decider is normally not sufficient evidence to prove
applicability of the futility exception.'" Also, the use of such an exception may
be required to be asserted at the district court level; one circuit has held that
failure to
assert such exception at the district level waives the issue upon
85
appeal.
More recently, the courts have identified a third exception to exhaustion in
contexts where the claimant would be irreparably harmed by delaying the
review. 86 This exception to the exhaustion doctrine, typically involving medical
claims where the life of the participant/beneficiary is in jeopardy, is one that has
'1 162 F.3d 410, 421 (6th Cir. 1998).
2

11

Id. at 420-21.

183See McGraw, 137 F.3d at 1263 (affirming district court's refusal to rely upon the plaintiff's

"bare allegation" of futility); Robyns v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 130 F.3d 1231, 1238 (7th
Cir. 1997) (requiring the claimant to show that denial was a "certainty"); Diaz v. United Agric.
Employee Welfare Benefit Plan & Trust, 50 F.3d 1478, 1485-86 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that
speculation regarding the futility of the administrative process was not sufficient); Kennedy v.
Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 989 F.2d 588, 592 (2d Cir. 1993) (requiring a "clear and
positive showing"); Coleman v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 18, 23 (D.D.C. 2000)
(conditioning the use of the futility exception upon the requirement that there be a "certainty of an
adverse decision"); Stewart v. NYNEX Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 172, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (requiring
a "clear and positive showing"); Harrow v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 76 F. Supp. 2d 558, 562
(requiring a "clear and positive showing").
184See Springer v. Wal-Mart Assocs. Group Health Plan, 908 F.2d 897, 901 (11 th Cir. 1990); Ames
v. Am. Nat'l Can Co., 170 F.3d 751, 756 (7th Cir. 1999). 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h)(3)(ii) (2001)
requires an independent appellate reviewer to be utilized, thus assuring the independence of the
review process. If such requirement was upheld as valid, it would decrease the use of the futility
exception. § 2560.503(h)(3)(ii).
185 Schmookler v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2279, at *6 (2d Cir.
Feb. 14, 1997).
186See generally Turner v. Fallon Cmty. Unity Health Plan, Inc., 127 F.3d 196, 200 (1st Cir. 1997)
(stating that "[a] failure to exhaust is easily forgiven for good reason, and no reason is better than
an imminent threat to life or health"), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1072 (1998); Henderson v. Bodine
Aluminum, Inc., 70 F.3d 958, 961 (8th Cir. 1995) (concluding that exhaustion of administrative
remedies was not required since missing treatment coupled with the plaintiff's grave illness
constituted irreparable harm); Wilson v. Globe Specialty Prods., Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 92, 99 (D.
Mass. 2000) (excusing the requirement of exhaustion in the context of irreparable harm); Watts v.
Organogenesis, Inc. 30 F. Supp. 2d 101, 104 (D. Mass. 1998) (noting that ERISA's requirements
need not be exhausted when a plaintiff faces an imminent threat to life or health).
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repeatedly
appeared in legislative attempts to permit immediate review by the
87
courts.1

In lieu of relying upon one of these three exceptions, two courts have relied
upon the doctrine of estoppel to prevent the defense from claiming that the
plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies. In the case of Bourgeois v.
Pension Planfor Employees of Santa Fe International Corps.,188 the claimant
had negotiated with the employer's most senior officers regarding his claim
payment instead of the plan administrator, and when he later initiated a lawsuit
189
for benefit denial, the defendant asserted that the claim was time-barred.
While no evidence was provided that it would have been futile to proceed with
the administrative remedies, the Fifth Circuit held that the defendants were
estopped from asserting the time-bar defense since the high-ranking officers
negotiated the benefits issue without proper authority.' 90 The court limited its
holding when it concluded that "[i]n sum, while not ruling out the possibility that
estoppel might allow a claimant to overcome a defense based on failure to
exhaust, we instead merely estop the defendants
from arguing that Bourgeois's
91
claim is time-barred before the Committee." 1
In the second decision, Gallegos v. Mt. Sinai Medical Center,192 the Seventh
Circuit discussed the estoppel theory when it noted that although the claimant
had been properly informed of the claims procedure, the plaintiff relied upon the
written misrepresentations by the insurer or plan administrator.' 93 These two
decisions may be used by other courts to expand the number of excuses permitted
to the exhaustion of administrative remedies theory.
2. Reasonableness of the Internal Claims Procedures
In fashioning the judicial requirement of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, the courts have been very cognizant of ERISA's two-fold requirement
187See Bipartisan Patient Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 2563, 107th Cong. (2001); Bipartisan

Patient Protection Act of 2001, S. 1052, 107th Cong. (2001); Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 1999,
S. 326, 106th Cong. (1999); Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act of 1999, S. 300 IS, 106th Cong.
(1999); Quality Care for the Uninsured Act of 1999, H.R. 2990 IH, 106th Cong. (1999) (amended
and renamed as Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act, H.R. 2990 EAS, 106th Cong. (1999)); Bipartisan
Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999, H.R. 2723 IH, 106th Cong. (1999); Patients'
Bill of Rights Plus Act of 1999, S. 1344, 106th Cong. (1999) (incorporated into Patients' Bill of
Rights Plus Act of 1999, H.R. 2990 EAS, 106th Cong. (1999)); Patients' Bill of Rights Act of
1999, S. 240, 106th Cong. (1999); Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 1999, H.R. 358, 106th Cong.
(1999); Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 1998, S. 2529 PCS, 105th Cong. (1998); Patients' Bill of
Rights Act of 1998, H.R. 3605 IH, 105th Cong. (1998); Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 1998, S.
1890 (1998); Patient Access to Responsible Care Act of 1997, H.R. 1415, 105th Cong. (1997).
i8 215 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2000).
89
Id. at 478.
1
90 Id. at 481-82.
'9 ' Id. at 482.
192210 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that defendant was not "estopped from asserting failure to
exhaust administrative remedies as a defense" because the plaintiff did not rely on
misrepresentations to her detriment), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 827 (2000).
93
' Id. at 810.
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necessitating an internal claims procedure for every employee benefit plan.
Under ERISA section 503, the statute requires the following:
In accordance with regulations of the Secretary, every employee benefit
plan shall - (1) provide adequate notice in writing to any participant or

beneficiary whose claim for benefits under the plan has been denied,
setting forth the specific reasons for such denial, written in a manner
calculated to be understood by the participant, and (2) afford a
reasonableopportunity to any participant whose claim for benefits has
been denied for a full and fair review by the appropriate named
fiduciary of the decision denying the claim.194
Thus, if part or all of a claimant's benefit claim is denied,195 ERISA directs the
plan administrator first, to provide to the claimant adequate and understandable
written reasons for the denial and, second, to afford a "full and fair review" of
such denial by an appropriate named fiduciary.196 Thus, ERISA provides two
levels to the benefit determination: (1) the initial determination as to whether or
not the claim will be paid or denied (with resulting notification rules attached),
and (2) the second level where the denial may be appealed internally, affording
the claimant to a "full and fair" review of the initial determination. Under the
courts' exhaustion doctrine, both levels of review must be satisfied before
adjudicating the matter in court.
The initial 1977 DOL claim procedure regulations stated that a plan's
internal claims procedure would be reasonable only if the procedure was
explained in the summary plan description, was not unduly complicated,
provided written notice of the plan's time limits, and otherwise complied with the
DOL regulations' notice requirements and review procedures rules.
The initial
regulations also required that the review procedures were not written or
administered in a way that "inhibits or hampers the process. '' 198 Given the use of

such terms as "adequate,"' 199 "reasonableness,

20°

and "full and fair,'2°1 neither

19429 U.S.C. § 1133 (1994) (emphasis added).
195Under the impending DOL claims regulations, the DOL adopts the phrase "adverse
benefit
determination" in lieu of the term "benefit denial" as it is intended to include not only denials in the
payment of benefits, but also terminations or reductions in providing benefits, refusals due to cost
containment measures, and failures of coverage on the basis that the item is "experimental,
investigational, or not medically necessary or appropriate." 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-10)(2) (2001).
Settlor decisions such as plan amendment or termination are not intended to be covered under the
phrase "adverse benefit determination." See Preamble, 63 Fed. Reg. 48,391 (Sept. 9,1998).
96 See 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2) (requiring the plan to "afford a reasonable opportunity to any
participant whose claims for benefits has been denied for a full and fair review by the appropriate
named fiduciary of the decision denying the claim").
19'
29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(b).
1929 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(b)(1)(3).
'9 See 29 U.S.C. § 1133(1) (providing "adequate notice").
200 See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(b) (requiring "[e]very employee benefit plan [to] establish and
maintain reasonable claims procedures"); 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h) (requiring that every plan
shall establish and maintain a procedure by which a claimant or his duly authorized representative
has a "reasonable opportunity to appeal" a denied claim).
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the statute nor the initial regulations imposed a rigid and exacting claims
procedure process, nor did either require the use of a second and different
fiduciary for purposes of conducting the full and fair review appeals process.

3. Adequacy of the Full and Fair Review at the Internal Appeals
Level
Much of the claims procedure litigation has focused on the second level of
the claims process - the internal appeal of the initial benefits denial that affords
the claimant with a "full and fair" review of the initial determination. In regards
to this review process, the initial 1977 regulations mandated that a plan's review
procedures provide the right of the claimant to initiate an appeal, to review
pertinent documents, and to submit issues and comments. 202 Time frames had to
be specified by the plan, and could not exceed certain maximums in the
regulations (e.g., appeal of denial to be made no later than sixty days after receipt
of the request).203
The courts have interpreted the full and fair review requirement to serve two
purposes: "to permit a plan's administrators to resolve disputes in an efficient,
streamlined, non-adversarial manner" and to "ensure that a plan participant is
protected from arbitrary or unprincipled decision-making. ' 2° While noting that
ERISA's "procedural guidelines are at the foundation of ERISA ' 20 5 and are
intended to protect participants and beneficiaries "from arbitrary or unprincipled
decision-making, ' 20 6 the courts affirm the right of the designated plan fiduciary
rather than the courts, to administer the plan and process claims. 207 The intent of
ERISA's claims procedure is to afford the
plan administrator sufficient time and
20 8
evidence to make an informed decision.
Litigation surrounding the full and fair review requirement has focused on
the documents necessarily considered in the review process, 20 9 the quality and
201 See 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2) (requiring "a full and fair review"); 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g) (stating

that "a full and 2fair review of the claim and its denial may be obtained").
202 29 C.F.R. § 560.503-1(g)(1).
203 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h)(1).
204 Ellis v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 228, 236-37 (4th Cir. 1997). See also Collins v. Cent.
States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Health & Welfare Fund, 18 F.3d 556, 561 (8th Cir. 1994) (mandating
that a full and fair review process requires fiduciaries "to set forth the rationale underlying their
decision so that the claimant may adequately prepare an appeal to the federal courts, and so that a
federal court may properly review the [t]rustees' decision" (internal quotations omitted)).
205 Weaver v. Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 990 F.2d 154, 157 (4th Cir. 1993).
206 See Grossmuller v. Int'l Union United Auto, Aerospace and Agr. Implement Workers of Am.,
UA, Local 813, 715 F.2d 853, 857 (3d Cir. 1983).
207 See Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co., 987 F.2d 1017, 1025 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing Perry v. Simplicity
Engineering, 900 F.2d 963, 966 (6th Cir. 1990), and Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003,
1007 (4th Cir. 1985), for the proposition that the district court should not be made a substitute plan
administrator); Nagele v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 193 F.R.D. 94, 101 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (requiring
that the decision-maker consider all the evidence as part of a full and fair review).
208 Grossmuller, 715 F.2d at 858 n.5 (requiring the decision-maker to consider both sides and
"develop a complete and impartial record").
209 See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(ii) (2001) (requiring that "pertinent documents" be discussed).
See also Ellis v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that a failure to provide
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extent of the evidence considered by the fiduciary, 210 use of witness testimony
211'2
and appearance of counsel, and lack of information given to the claimant.212
The majority of circuits have required only substantial compliance to the
statutory and regulatory claim procedure rules, in lieu of a rigid, complete
standard of compliance. 21 3 Only where the courts have discovered serious
violations of the DOL regulations have they held a lack of adequate due
process. 214 However, given the lack of an explicit substantive remedy for
pertinent documents constitutes a denial of full and fair review); Dade v. Sherwin-Williams Co.,
128 F.3d 1135, 1142-43 (7th Cir. 1997) (upholding the plan's obligation to provide pertinent
documents but acknowledging the lack of remedy for such failure); Wilczynski v. Lumbermens
Mut. Cas. Co, 93 F.3d 397, 405-07 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the claimant's request for the entire
file as too broad, but affirming the right of the claimant to receive pertinent documents); Curry v.
Contract Fabricators Inc. Profit Sharing Plan, 891 F.2d 842, 846-47 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting that
failure to turnover plan documents elaborating remedies and plan administrator's reasons for denial
of claim amounts to a denial of meaningful access); Russo v. Abington Mem'l Hosp. Healthcare
Plan, 907 F. Supp. 857, 862 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (noting that failure to furnish pertinent documents
constitutes a denial of meaningful access to the appeals process).
210 See Halpin v. W.W. Grainger Inc., 962 F.2d 685, 689 (7th Cir. 1992). See also Bernstein v.
Capitalcare, Inc., 70 F.3d 783, 790 (4th Cir. 1995) (remanding case to afford claimant with a full
and fair review due to the lack of evidence in the administrative record); Cox v. Mid-Am.
Dairymen, Inc., 965 F.2d 569, 573-74 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that the review process lacked
sufficient evidence to substantiate denial), rev'd on other grounds, 13 F.3d 272 (8th Cir. 1993);
Lidoshore v. Health Fund 917, 994 F. Supp. 229, 236-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating that "[a]t the
very least, a full and fair review requires that the fiduciary inform the participant or beneficiary of
the evidence that the fiduciary relied upon and provide an opportunity to examine that evidence and
to submit written comments or rebuttal documents" (internal quotations omitted)). But cf Sandoval
v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 377, 382 (10th Cir. 1992) (upholding full and fair review as
claimant was invited to submit additional evidence but failed to do so).
211 See Grossmuller,715 F.2d at 857-58 (ignoring the plan's own practice of permitting testimony
of witnesses but denying it to the claimant constituted a denial of a full and fair review). But see
Hlinka v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 863 F.2d 279, 282-87 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding a full and fair
review present even though counsel and claimant were not present at the review session); Brown v.
Ret. Comm. of the Briggs & Stratton Ret. Plan, 797 F.2d 521, 534 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that a
full and fair review does not require the presence of counsel), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1094 (1987).
212 See Weaver v. Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 990 F.2d 154, 157-59 (4th Cir. 1993) (failing
to disclose basis for denial was insufficient); Vanderklok v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co.,
956 F.2d 610, 615-17 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding a conclusory denial letter to be inadequate); Halpin,
962 F.2d at 688-94 (finding that the plan acted arbitrarily in not advising claimant as to what
information to be submitted upon appeal); S. Fla. Blood Bank, Inc. v. Futch, 764 So.2d 715, 726
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (not requiring claimant to resort to administrative remedies as they would
be "clearly useless").
213 See Terry v. Bayer Corp., 145 F.3d 28, 39 (1st Cir. 1998); Schmidt v. Sheet Metal Workers'
Nat'l Pension Fund, 128 F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 1997); Kent v. United of Omaho Life Ins. Co., 96 F.3d
803, 807-08 (6th Cir. 1996); Wald v. S.W. Bell Corp. Customcare Med. Plan., 83 F.3d 1002 (8th
Cir. 1996); Bechtold v. Physicians Health Plan, 19 F.3d 322 (7th Cir. 1994); McKenzie v. Gen. Tel.
Co., 41 F.3d 1310, 1318 (9th Cir. 1994); Tolley v. Commercial Life Ins. Co., 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 33508 (6th Cir. Dec. 17, 1993); Kraut v. Wis. Laborers Health Fund, 992 F.2d 113 (7th Cir.
1993); Halpin v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 962 F.2d 685, 690 (7th Cir. 1992); Davidson v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1992); Madden v. lT Long Term Disability Plan for Salaried
Employees, 914 F.2d 1279, 1286 (9th Cir. 1990); Perez-Rodriguez v. Citibank, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3367, at *19 (D.P.R. Mar. 16,1995).
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procedural violations under ERISA section 503, courts have been unable to reach
a consensus regarding the appropriate penalty for such violations. Most courts
simply remand the case to the plan fiduciary for reconsideration of the benefit
denial; 2 15 others will grant the benefit being requested. 21 6 Repeated and flagrant
disregard for the plan's claim procedures may amount to a breach217of fiduciary
duty, resulting in remedies as provided by ERISA section 502(a)(2).

4. Legislative Attempts to Provide Patients with the Right to
Independent Medical Review
Recent legislative efforts have attempted to provide greater consumer
protections in the health care industry, specifically focused on providing patients
with the right to independent medical review for denial of medical care under
health plans and expansive federal remedies in the event the patient has been
injured by the wrongful denial or delay of medical care. 218 In the context of
group health plans covered by ERISA, legislative efforts would appear to be
necessary to amend ERISA section 503 claims procedures (as the use of
independent medical review is not presently required for denials of medical care)
Schleibaum v. Kmart Corp., 153 F.3d 496, 499-500 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming district courts'
finding that substantial noncompliance denied the claimant full and fair review), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 1105 (1999); Weaver v. Phoenix Home Life Mut. Life. Co., 990 F.2d 154, 158 (4th Cir. 1993)
(holding that a total lack of explanation resulted in a denial of full and fair review); Vanderklok,
956 F.2d at 616 (holding that a lack of explanation denied a full and fair review); Halpin, 962 F.2d
at 693-94 (finding a lack of explanation and evidence on behalf of the administration denied a full
and fair review).
215 See Bernstein v. Capitalcare, Inc., 70 F.3d 783, 790 (4th Cir. 1995); Jett v. Blue
Cross & Blue
Shield, 890 F.2d 1137, 1139-40 (11 th Cir. 1989); Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1007
(4th Cir. 1985); Denton v. First Nat'l Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1304 (5th Cir. 1985); Wardle v. Cent.
States Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 824 (7th Cir. 1980).
216 See Parker v. BankAmerica Corp., 50 F.3d 757, 769 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming recovery of
benefits when the claimant can show that procedural violations caused substantive harm); Weaver,
990 F.2d at 159 (noting that remand is the proper course for procedural violations, but deciding the
case as the evidence clearly indicated that the plan administrator abused its discretion); Vanderklok
v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., Inc., 956 F.2d 610, 616 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that
procedural errors by the plan administrator amounted to "a significant error on a question of law,
which requires that the decision to deny benefits be overturned"). But see Lake v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 73 F.3d 1372, 1378 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that "plaintiffs would not be entitled to recover
substantive damages even if we found.., violations of the procedural sections of ERISA").
217See, e.g., Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348, 1353-54 (9th Cir. 1988).
218 See Bipartisan Patient Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 2563, 107th Cong. (2001); Bipartisan
Patient Protection Act of 2001, S. 1052, 107th Cong. (2001); Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 1999,
S. 326, 106th Cong. (1999); Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act of 1999, S. 300 IS, 106th Cong.
(1999); Quality Care for the Uninsured Act of 1999, H.R. 2990 IH, 106th Cong. (1999) (amended
and renamed as Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act, H.R. 2990 EAS, 106th Cong. (1999)); Bipartisan
Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999, H.R. 2723 IH, 106th Cong. (1999); Patients'
Bill of Rights Plus Act of 1999, S. 1344, 106th Cong. (1999) (incorporated into Patients' Bill of
Rights Plus Act of 1999, H.R. 2990 EAS, 106th Cong. (1999)); Patients' Bill of Rights Act of
1999, S. 240, 106th Cong. (1999); Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 1999, H.R. 358, 106th Cong.
(1999); Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 1998, S. 2529 PCS, 105th Cong. (1998); Patients' Bill of
Rights Act of 1998, H.R. 3605 IH, 105th Cong. (1998); Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 1998, S.
1890 (1998); Patient Access to Responsible Care Act of 1997, H.R. 1415, 105th Cong. (1997).
214
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and ERISA section 514 preemption clause (to permit state claims for wrongful
denial or delay in benefit claims against ERISA plans).
Both the recently passed House and Senate patients' rights legislation
proposed changes to ERISA's section 503 claim procedure requirements
requiring faster response times to benefit requests and requests for information;
more stringent requirements as to information that must appear in the denial
notice; expedited reviews of benefit denial, conducted by a individual with
appropriate expertise who was not involved in the initial determination; review
by health care professional for denials based on lack of medical necessity or
experimental/investigational treatment or requiring an evaluation of medical
facts; and use of an independent external appeals procedure. 21 9 Both bills
provide for an additional ERISA section 502 cause of action for failure to comply
with the requirements of the bill of rights, supplying remedies for the wrongful
denial or delay of medical care for claimants under employee benefit plans. 220
Both bills would require patients to exhaust the plan's initial claims procedures
and internal appeals process prior to bringing a suit under the newly created
cause of action.
5. Overhaul of the Exhaustion Doctrine Under the Impending DOL
Regulations
Responding to the directive of the Clinton administration to implement the
Commissions' recommendations, the DOL proposed regulations in 1998, later
finalized in 2000, that made drastic changes to the claims procedure rules. At the
first stage of the benefit review, the DOL intensified the requirements necessary
to adequately notify claimants of a denial (e.g., drastically accelerated the time
limits for review of health claims based on the type of claim, replacing the
former window period with significantly shorter time periods). 222 The intent of
such accelerated time commitment was to increase response time to claimants,
especially in life-threatening situations, which has been the motivation behind
various patients' bills of rights.22 3 The regulations also required, for health and
disability plans, disclosure of the internal rules, protocol or criterion used in
benefit determinations, as well as an explanation of scientific or clinical
judgment used if the denial was based on medical necessity or experimental in
nature.224
219 See Bipartisan Patient Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 2563, 107th Cong. (2001); Bipartisan
Patient Protection Act of 2001, S. 1052, 107th Cong. (2001); see also supra text accompanying
note 62.
220
See H.R. 2563 (as amended by numbered 2 and 3 in House Report 107-184); S. 1052.
221See H.R. 2563 (as amended by numbered 2 and 3 in House Report 107-184); S. 1052.
222 See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(f)(2)(i) (2001).
223 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g). The DOL regulations alter the time periods based on whether the
claim is for urgent care, pre-service or post-service claims, mandating a much shorter period of
time for urgent care claims. Id.
224 Id. According to the Preamble in the DOL proposed regulations, this fifth requirement was
necessary to "satisfy the claimant's need to understand the evidentiary basis for the decision and
therefore to determine whether an appeal is justified and how such an appeal might best be
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Regarding ERISA's second stage of claims procedure - the full and fair
review stage - the DOL finalized 2000 regulations made sweeping changes,
requiring the de novo review of every benefit denial at this second stage of
review by a fiduciary who was not the same fiduciary (nor subordinate) used in
the initial review, and, if such review of benefits was based on medical judgment,
requiring consultation with a health care professional independent of the
professional involved in the initial review and who has competent experience
within the medical field.225 Disclosure of pertinent files at this stage would be
affected as the description of "relevant documents" would now be increased to
include any document relied upon in making the decision; any document
generated in the course of making the decision whether or not relied upon;
documents that demonstrate the employer's compliance with the administrative
processes and safeguards now required under the regulations; and for
health/disability claims, a statement of the plan's
concerning the denied
,• policy
• 226
treatment option or benefit for the claimant's diagnosis.
Since Congress has
been introducing legislation to provide many of these same protections, Congress
must believe that the DOL does not have the regulatory power to accomplish
these goals. Thus, it is likely that the DOL 2000 regulations will be withdrawn
or substantially altered if and when a patients' bill of rights is passed in
Congress.
The most far-reaching stretch of the DOL's regulatory power occurs in its
newest regulations where it attempts to dismiss the judicial requirement of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, something that even the bold legislative
efforts do not attempt. 227 The DOL regulations prescribe that the sanction for
failure to comply with any aspects of the reformulated claims procedure
regulations is immediate access to courts, despite the determination of any
benefit denial, or availability of any administrative record.228 In the Preamble to
its impending regulations, the DOL noted that commentators had suggested
adopting a standard of good faith compliance as a measure for requiring
administrative exhaustion, or adopting the judicial exhaustion doctrine unless the
administrative processes pose an actual harm to the claimant. 229 However, the
DOL rejected those measures, insisting that claimants should not be required to
comply with a plan's claims procedures if these procedures do not rigidly comply
pursued." 63 Fed. Reg. 48,395 (Sept. 9, 1998). The DOL acknowledges in the Preamble that the
increased administrative costs associated with disclosure of fuller information but justifies such
requirement based on increased likelihood in the accuracy of the review process. Id.
225 See 29 C.F.R. §§ 2560.503-1(h)(3)(iii), (v) (2001).
226 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(m)(8).
227 See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(1). See also Davenport v. Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 249 F.3d 130, 133
(2d Cir. 2001) (acknowledging the three-fold purposes of the exhaustion requirement: to uphold
Congress' desire that ERISA trustees, not the federal courts, be responsible for their actions; to
provide a sufficiently clear record of administrative action if litigation later ensues; and to assure
that any judicial review of the fiduciary's action or inaction is made under the arbitrary and
capricious standard).
22'29 C.F.R. § 2650.503-1(1).
229 See Preamble, 65 Fed. Reg. 70,246, 70,255-56 (Nov. 21, 2000) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. §
2560).

HeinOnline -- 70 UMKC L. Rev. 371 2001-2002

UMKC LAW REVIEW

[Vol.70:2

with the regulations. 230 Based on the reasons reiterated by the courts in their
formulation of the judicial doctrine of exhaustion, it is highly doubtful that the
courts would eliminate this requirement absent legislative authority.

I. Judicial Standard of Review
The statutory language of ERISA is silent regarding the applicable judicial
standard of review of any ERISA causes of actions, including the denial of
benefit claims. Pre-ERISA, a number of courts in the employee benefits context
began using the "arbitrary and capricious" judicial standard applicable under
labor law. 23 This standard, articulated in a line of cases deriving from Danti v.
Lewis, applied the arbitrary and capricious standard to non-union benefit denial
claims.
The result was to afford deferential review of the fiduciary's decision
to deny benefits. When ERISA was passed in 1974 without an applicable
standard of review, the courts continued their use of the arbitrary and capricious
standard.233 Thus, courts would not overturn the fiduciary's decision so long as it
was rationally justifiable and made in good faith, regardless of whether it was the
230

Id. at 70,256.

231See

Dennard v. Richards Group, Inc., 681 F.2d 306, 307 (5th Cir. 1982); Wardle v. Cent. States,
S.E. and S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 824 (7th Cir. 1980); Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d
1362, 1371 (9th Cir. 1976); Pete v. United Mine Workers of Am. Welfare and Ret. Fund of 1950,
517 F.2d 1275, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Gomez v. Lewis, 414 F.2d 1312, 1313-14 (3d Cir. 1969);
Roark v. Lewis, 401 F.2d 425, 426-27 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Miniard v. Lewis, 387 F.2d 864, 865 (D.C.
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 873 (1968); Kosty v. Lewis, 319 F.2d 744, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 964 (1964); Danti v. Lewis, 312 F.2d 345, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
232 Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1371 (9th Cir. 1976) (referring to cases that have followed the
decision in Danti,312 F.2d 345, as the Danti cases).
233 See, e.g., Bachelder v. Communications Satellite Corp., 837 F.2d 519, 521-23 (1st Cir. 1988)
(applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to the termination of cash distributions from a stock
ownership plan); Accardi v. Control Data Corp., 836 F.2d 126, 128 (2d Cir. 1987) (using the
arbitrary and capricious standard in the contexts of denials under the severance pay plan), affd.,
869 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1989); Whipp v. Seafarers Vacation Plan, 832 F.2d 853, 855 (4th Cir. 1987)
(holding that the arbitrary and capricious standard was the applicable standard for review of the
acts of trustees regarding plan administration); Nevill v. Shell Oil Co., 835 F.2d 209, 212 (9th Cir.
1987) (upholding the denial of the Special Separation Allowance to the employees as it was not
arbitrary nor capricious); Naugle v. O'Connell, 833 F.2d 1391, 1393 (10th Cir. 1987) (recognizing
that the eligibility requirements were not subject to collective bargaining, and requiring the use of
the arbitrary and capricious standard to overturn the denial of benefits); Deak v. Masters, Mates and
Pilots Pension Plan, 821 F.2d 572, 577-79 (11th Cir. 1987) (discussing the use of the arbitrary and
capricious standard), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 (1988); Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. 761 F.2d
1003, 1006 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting the use of the arbitrary and capricious standard regarding the
actions of the private plan trustee); Denton v. First Nat'l Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1300 (5th Cir.
1985), reh'g denied, 772 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1985) (requiring the use of the arbitrary and capricious
standard for actions and inactions of fiduciaries); Pokratz v. Jones Dairy Farm, 771 F.2d 206, 208
(7th Cir. 1985) (requiring the arbitrary and capricious standard to overturn the plan's denial of
disability benefits); Bayles v. Cent. States., S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 602 F.2d 97, 99 (8th
Cir. 1979) (affirming the trustee's actions unless found to be arbitrary and capricious). See also
Bradley R. Duncan, Note, Legislation Under ERISA: Judicial Review of Fiduciary Claim Denials
Under ERISA: An Alternative to the Arbitrary & Capricious Test, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 986, 987
n.8 (1986).
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best decision under the circumstances.
By 1989, there was dissention among
the circuits, as some felt the use of such a deferential standard was not justified in
contexts where the plan administrator was not necessarily impartial in the
determination of benefits.235 The Supreme Court utilized certiorariin the case of
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch236 to resolve the split among the circuits.
In rejecting the use of labor law, the Court turned to trust law, thereby focusing
on the explicit terms of the plan in determining whether the plan administrator
had the discretionary powers to make benefits determinations. 237 Absent such
explicit discretionary powers, the judicial standard would be de novo, which
results in a plenary review of the decision of the plan administrator. 38 In the
event the appropriate powers had been conferred, the Court mentioned the other
trust law standard - "abuse of discretion" - and specifically referred to the
See Whipp v. Seafarers Vacation Plan, 832 F.2d 853, 855-56 (4th Cir. 1987); Atkinson v. Sheet
Metal Workers' Trust Funds, 833 F.2d 864, 865 (9th Cir. 1987); Hancock v. Montgomery Ward
Long Term Disability Trust, 787 F.2d 1302, 1307 (9th Cir. 1986); Blakeman v. Mead Containers,
779 F.2d 1146, 1150 (6th Cir. 1985); Lawrence v. Westerhaus, 780 F.2d 1321, 1322 (8th Cir.
1985); Morse v. Stanley, 732 F.2d 1139, 1145-46 (2d Cir. 1984); Wolf v. Nat'l Shopmen Pension
Fund, 728 F.2d 182, 189 (3d Cir. 1984); Johnson v. Franco, 727 F.2d 442, 447 (5th Cir. 1984);
Allen v. UMW 1979 Benefit Plan & Trust, 726 F.2d 352, 354 (7th Cir. 1984); LeFebre v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 747 F.2d 197, 199 (9th Cir. 1984); Miles v. New York Teamsters
Conference Pension and Ret. Fund, 698 F.2d 593, 601 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829
(1983); Dennard v. Richards Group, Inc., 681 F.2d 306, 313 (5th Cir. 1982).
235 See Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1560 (11th Cir. 1990) (referring to
cases pre-Firestone, the court noted that the circuits varied regarding the deference affording the
trustee/fiduciary's decisions based on the presence of a conflict of interest), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1040 (1991); Sage v. Automation, Inc. Pension Plan & Trust, 845 F.2d 885, 895 (10th Cir. 1988)
(stating that the arbitrary and capricious standard was sufficiently flexible to examine trustee bias);
Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052-53 (7th Cir. 1987)
(affirming the flexibility of the arbitrary and capricious standard in taking bias into account);
Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320, 328-29 (2d Cir. 1985) (reviewing the denial of
benefits under the arbitrary and capricious standard); Holland v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d
1140, 1149 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting that there was only a single standard to apply, denied use of a
"less deferential" standard); Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 711-12 (9th Cir. 1985) (using the
arbitrary and capricious standard despite the granting of less deference to the trustee's decision);
Maggard v. O'Connell, 671 F.2d 568, 571 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (requiring "review with greater care"
when applying the arbitrary and capricious standard in the conflict of interest contexts); Dennard v.
Richards Group, Inc., 681 F.2d 306, 314 (5th Cir. 1982) (outlining the factors to use in the
application of the arbitrary and capricious standard, including conflict of interest).
2 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
237 Id. at 110-11 (stating that the lower court's use of the labor law standard improperly relied upon
a jurisdictional
analogy between LMRA and ERISA).
23
8
Id. at 112-13
234

(The trust law de novo standard of review is consistent with the judicial
interpretation of employee benefit plans prior to the enactment of ERISA.
Actions challenging an employer's denial of benefits before enactment of
ERISA were governed by principles of contract law. If the plan did not give
the employer or administrator discretionary or final authority to construe
uncertain terms, the court reviewed the employee's claim as it would have any
other contract claim by looking to the terms of the plan and other
manifestations of the parties' intent.).
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Second Restatement of Trusts. 239 As the case in question did not specifically
reserve appropriate powers to the plan administrator, the case was remanded for
de novo review. 240 As a result, the Firestone holding was viewed as narrow and
restrictive, since the plan sponsor certainly could draft the proper discretionary
powers in the plan to ensure deferential review and to avoid de novo review. 24 1
In litigating an ERISA benefit denial case, it is critical whether the court
applies a de novo standard or an arbitrary and capricious standard in reviewing
the plan administrator's decision. The claimant obviously prefers the de novo
standard as it affords an independent review of the decision by the courts;
whereas the defendant prefers the highly deferential arbitrary and capricious
standard, affirming the plan administrator's decision unless it was "arbitrary,
capricious, or made in bad faith .... not supported by substantial evidence. ,,242
Which standard is applied sharply determines the outcome of the case.
A number of issues have faced the courts after Firestone as they continue to
fashion a judicial standard of review in ERISA benefit denial cases. The first
focuses on the plan language necessary to shift from the de novo standard. The
239 Id. at 115. See also Restatement (Second) of Trusts, which refers to a number of factors in the
application of the abuse of discretion standard:
[I]n determining the question whether the trustee is guilty of an abuse of
discretion in exercising or failing to exercise a power, the following
circumstances may be relevant: (1) the extent of the discretion conferred upon
the trustee by the terms of the trust; (2) the purposes of the trust; (3) the nature
of the power; (4) the existence or non-existence, the definiteness or
indefiniteness, of an external standard by which the reasonableness of the
trustee's conduct can be judged; (5) the motives of the trustee in exercising or
refraining from exercising the power; (6) the existence or nonexistence of an
interest in the trustee conflicting with that of the beneficiaries.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d (1959).
240 Firestone,489 U.S. at 118.
241 See John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 S.CT. REv. 207, 219; Kevin
Walker Beatty, Comment, A Decade of Confusion: The Standard of Review for ERISA Benefit
Denial Claims as Establishedby Firestone, 51 ALA. L. REv. 733, 740-44 (2000); Nola A. Kohler,
Note, An Overview of the Inconsistency Among the Circuits Concerning the Conflict of Interest
Analysis Applied in an ERISA Action with an Emphasis on the Eighth Circuit's Adoption of the
Sliding Scale Analysis in Woo v. Deluxe Corporation,75 N.D. L. REv. 815, 820-27 (2000) (noting
the inconsistency over the use of de novo standard of review in conflict of interest contexts); Dahlia
Schwartz, Note, Breathing Lessons for the ERISA Vacuum: Toward a Reconciliation of ERISA's
Competing Objectives in the Health Benefits Area, 79 B.U. L. REv. 631, 657-58 (1999)
("Unfortunately in Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, the Supreme Court opened Pandora's
box by suggesting in dicta that nothing 'forecloses parties for agreeing upon a narrower standard of
review."' (citing Firestone,489 U.S. at 115) (emphasis added))).
242 See Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 382 (3d Cit. 2000); Meditrust Fin.
Servs. Corp. v. Sterling Chem., Inc., 168 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 1999); Brogan v. Holland, 105
F.3d 158, 161 (4th Cit. 1997); Donaho v. FMC Corp., 74 F.3d 894, 898 (8th Cit. 1996); Pagan v.
NYNEX Pension Plan, 52 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 1995); Bernstein v. CapitalCare, Inc., 70 F.3d
783, 788 (4th Cir. 1995); Abnathya v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 45 (3d Cir. 1993);
Millensifer v. Ret. Plan for Salaried Employees of Cotter Corp., 968 F.2d 1005, 1009 (10th Cir.
1992); Baker v. UMW of Am. Health & Ret. Funds, 929 F.2d 1140, 1144 (6th Cir. 1991); Van
Boxel v. Journal Co. Employee's Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1049 (7th Cir. 1988).
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majority view is that the necessary discretionary powers be explicit (not inferred
from other powers) in the plan document.243 While the courts do not require the
use of specific words such as "discretion" or "deference," obviously the clearer
and more explicit the grant of discretionary authority, the greater is the likelihood
of avoiding the de novo standard of review. 24 Much litigation in this area is
directed at the terms "proof of loss" or "satisfactory proof of loss" found in
typical insurance contracts. 245 Such language is argued by the insurers to grant
sufficient discretionary powers for determining benefits because the discretion as
to whether the proof for loss has been met rests with the insurer. The courts have
not supported such an argument. 246 Just recently, the Seventh Circuit proposed
safe harbor plan language, to guarantee that the necessary discretionary powers
243 See Wildbur v. ARCO Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that "[d]iscretionary

authority cannot be implied"); Cathey v. Dow Chem. Co. Med. Care Program, 907 F.2d 554, 559
(5th Cir. 1990); Perry v. Simplicity Eng., 900 F.2d 963, 965 (6th Cir. 1990) (requiring an express
grant of discretion); Brown v. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp., 876 F.2d 546, 550 (6th Cir. 1989)
(requiring the grant of discretion to be "clear"); Moon v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86,
88 (1 lth Cir. 1989) (requiring that discretionary authority to be expressly granted in the plan);
Brown v. Seitz Foods, Inc., Disability Benefit Plan, 140 F.3d 1198, 1200 (8th Cir. 1998)
(mandating that "express discretion-granting language" be evident in the document). Contra Luby
v. Teamsters Health, Welfare and Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176, 1180 (3d Cir. 1991)
(willing to find discretionary powers as the plan in question "neither expressly nor impliedly
grant[ed] such discretion"); De Nobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 1180, 1187 (4th Cir. 1989)
(applying the abuse of discretion standard).
24See McDaniel v. Chevron Corp., 203 F.3d 1099, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000) (indicating that an
administrator with the sole discretion to interpret plan terms is permissible); Bendixen v. Standard
Ins. Co., 185 F.3d 939, 943 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (permitting plan language where plan
administrator's decisions were conclusive and binding); Friedrich v. Intel Corp., 181 F.3d 1105,
1110 n.5 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming the language "sole discretion to interpret the terms of the Plan
and to determine eligibility for benefits" as a discretionary power); Donaho v. FMC Corp., 74 F.3d
894, 898 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that "discretionary authority to construe and interpret the terms of
the Plan, including, but not limited to, deciding all questions of eligibility" is acceptable); Kotrosits
v. Gatx Corp. Non-Contributory Pension Plan for Salaried Employees, 970 F.2d 1165, 1168 (3d
Cir. 1992) (approving plan language rendering the plan administrator's decisions final and
binding).
245 Kearney v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999).
246 See Herzburger v. Standard Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 327, 332 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
"satisfactory proof' language is not sufficient to grant discretionary authority); Kinstler v. First
Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 243, 251-52 (2d Cir. 1999) (concluding that language in
a plan that required a claimant to "submit satisfactory proof of Total Disability to us" demands an
objective standard, not a subjective one, in determining loss); Kearney v. Standard Ins. Co., 175
F.3d 1084, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the typical insurance language "satisfactory
written proof' of loss does not confer discretionary authority to the insurer); Brown v. Seitz Foods,
Inc., Disability Benefit Plan, 140 F.3d 1198, 1200 (8th Cir. 1998) (affirming that provisions such as
"[t]o be considered disabled," "as long as the definition of total disability is satisfied," and "due...
proof of loss" do not confer discretionary power to decide claims). But see Patterson v. Caterpillar,
Inc. 70 F.3d 503, 505 (7th Cir. 1995) (approving language "upon receipt by ... due proof ... of
such disability" as sufficient to grant discretion); Donato v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 19 F.3d 375, 37980 (7th Cir. 1994) (waiving the requirement that plan language contain an explicit grant of
discretionary authority); Bali v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, 873 F.2d 1043, 1047 (7th Cir.
1989) (approving language "evidence satisfactory to the Committee" as a discretionary grant of
authority).
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have been conferred upon the plan administrator, in an effort to resolve the
issue.241
Once the necessary discretionary powers had been reserved to the plan
administrator in the document, the next issue facing the courts was what
appropriate judicial standard of review to use. All the circuits agreed that the two
applicable judicial standards of review in ERISA benefit denial cases are the de
novo standard and the more deferential abuse of discretion standard. 248 However,
most courts continue to use the labor law arbitrary and capricious standard rather
than the abuse of discretion standard as the deferential standard of review, noting
in passing that the two standards are equivalent in the ERISA context. 249 Only
the Fourth Circuit views the applicable abuse of discretion differently, seeing it
as a less deferential standard than the arbitrary and capricious standard.25 °
Under the highly deferential arbitrary and capricious standard, the majority
of circuits will uphold the plan administrator's denial of benefits unless such
determination was "arbitrary, capricious, or made in bad faith.... not supported

247 Herzberger, 205 F.3d at 331 (recommending such safe harbor language for inclusion under

ERISA plans: "[b]enefits under this plan will be paid only if the plan administrator decides in his
discretion that the applicant is entitled to them").
248 See Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.2d 377, 379 (3d Cir. 2000); Barnhart v.
Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 179 F.3d 583, 588-90 (8th Cir. 1999); Doyle v. Paul Revere Life Ins.
Co., 144 F.3d 181, 183-84 (1st Cir. 1998); Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace & Def. Co., 82 F.3d 1251,
1255 (2d Cir. 1996); Snow v. Standard Ins. Co., 87 F.3d 327, 330-31 (9th Cir. 1996); Chambers v.
Family Health Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818, 825-26 (10th Cir. 1996); Doe v. Group Hospitalization &
Med. Servs., 3 F.3d 80, 85 (4th Cir. 1993); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 898 F.2d
1556, 1560-63 (lth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991); Van Boxel v. Journal Co.

Employee's Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052-53 (7th Cir. 1987). The Fourth, Fifth, Eighth,
Ninth and Tenth Circuits prefer the use of the terms "abuse of discretion" over "arbitrary and
capricious." See Booth v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 201 F.3d 335, 341-42 (4th Cir. 2000); Meditrust
Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Sterling Chem., Inc., 168 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 1999); Barnhart v. Unum Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 179 F.3d 583, 588 (8th Cir. 1999); McGraw v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 137
F.3d 1253, 1258-59 (10th Cir. 1998). Compare the above cases with the Eleventh Circuit holding
in Marecek v. Bellsouth Services, Inc., 49 F.3d 702, 704 (1 lth Cir. 1995), which states that there
are three standards of review: "(1) de novo, applicable where the plan administrator is not afforded
discretion; (2) arbitrary and capricious where the plan administrator possesses discretion; and (3)
heightened arbitrary and capricious where there is a conflict of interest."
249
See Meditrust Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Sterling Chem., Inc., 168 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 1999); Ross
v. Ind. Teacher's Ass'n Ins. Trust, 159 F.3d 1001, 1009 (7th Cir. 1998); DeWitt v. Penn-Del
Directory Corp., 106 F.3d 514, 520 (3d Cir. 1997); Morton v. Smith, 91 F.3d 867, 870 (7th Cir.
1996); Snow v. Standard Ins. Co., 87 F.3d 327, 330 (9th Cir. 1996); Chambers v. Family Health
Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818, 825 n.l (10th Cir. 1996); Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317,
1321 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995); Wildbur v. ARCO Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 635 (5th Cir. 1992); Cox v.
Mid-Am. Dairymen, Inc., 965 F.2d 569, 571-72 (8th Cir. 1992) (Cox I), aff'd after remand, 13 F.3d
272 (8th Cir. 1993) (Cox II); Miller v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 925 F.2d 979, 984 (6th Cir. 1991); Jett
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 890 F.2d 1137, 1139 (11 th Cir. 1989).
250
See Booth v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 201 F.3d 335, 341-42 (4th Cir. 2000) (opting for the abuse
of discretion standard, not the arbitrary and capricious standard, as the "appropriate one for judicial
review of a fiduciary's discretionary decision under ERISA"). Under this standard, the Fourth
Circuit will not overturn the fiduciary's discretionary decision "if it is reasonable." Id. at 342.
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by substantial evidence.

2 l

Such a standard has been described as one that

affirms the plan administrator's decision unless "totally unreasonable, ' ' 5
,,,25
"whimsical, random, or unreasoned, ,253 or "downright unreasonable., 25 4
In

support of such a highly deferential standard, the courts note that ERISA does not
permit them to substitute their decision for that of the25plan administrator,
provided that the administrator's decision was reasonable.255 This standard is
applied by the courts not only in benefit determination contexts, but also in plan
interpretation contexts where the claimant's benefits are contingent on the
interpretation
of the plan (e.g., benefits for "mental illness" are excluded under
256
plan).
the
The facts in the Firestonecase involved a conflict of interest as the employer
was the plan administrator under a self-funded ERISA plan, thus having a
financial interest in denying the claim for benefits. While the applicable standard
in that case was to be the de novo standard, the Court noted that if discretionary
powers had been reserved to the plan administrator who was operating under a
conflict of interest, such conflict would be a factor in the application of the abuse
of discretion standard. 7 This direction to the lower courts has resulted in a

251

Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1371 (9th Cir. 1976). See also Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life

Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 382 (3d Cir. 2000); Meditrust Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Sterling Chem., Inc., 168
F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 1999); Brogan v. Holland, 105 F.3d 158, 161 (4th Cir. 1997); Donaho v.
FMC Corp., 74 F.3d 894, 898 (8th Cir. 1996); Bernstein v. CapitalCare, Inc., 70 F.3d 783, 788 (4th
Cir. 1995); Pagan v. NYNEX Pension Plan, 52 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 1995); Abnathya v.
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 45 (3d Cir. 1993); Millensifer v. Ret. Plan for Salaried
Employees of Cotter Corp., 968 F.2d 1005, 1009-10 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting Woolsey v. Marion
Labratories, Inc., 934 F.2d 1452, 1467 (10th Cir. 1991)); Baker v. UMW of Am. Health & Ret.
Funds, 929 F.2d 1140, 1144 (6th Cir. 1991).
252 Allen v. UMW of Am., 726 F.2d 352, 354 (7th Cir. 1984) (remarking that only totally
unreasonable decisions will be overturned in the absence of evidence of bad faith).
253Teskey v. M.P. Metal Prods., Inc., 795 F.2d 30, 32 (7th Cir. 1986) (describing the arbitrary and
capricious standard as narrow in application).
254 See Carr v. Gates Health Care Plan, 195 F.3d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Butler v.
Encyclopedia Brittanica, Inc., 41 F.3d 285, 291 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding the plan administrator's
decision as not arbitrary or capricious)).
255 See Carr, 195 F.3d at 294-95; Terry v. Bayer Corp., 145 F.3d 28, 40 (1st Cir. 1998); Ellis v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 228, 232-33 (4th Cir. 1997); Donaho, 74 F.3d at 899; Miller v.
United Welfare Fund, 72 F.3d 1066, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 1995); Stewart v. Nat'l Shopmen Pension
Fund, 795 F.2d 1079, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
256 See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 382; MeditrustFin. Servs. Corp., 168 F.3d at 214; Brogan, 105 F.3d at
161; Donaho, 74 F.3d at 898; Bernstein, 70 F.3d at 788; Pagan,52 F.3d at 442; Abnathya, 2 F.3d at
45; Millensifer, 968 F.2d at 1009; Baker, 929 F.2d at 1144. Some courts, however, have applied
the state insurance law doctrine of "contra proferentem" in resolving the ambiguity in the context
of determining ambiguous plan language. See Kinstler v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 181
F.3d 243, 252 (2d Cir. 1999); Kearney v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999)
(en banc), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 964 (1999); Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Employees of
Agency Rent-A-Car Hosp. Ass'n, 122 F.3d 336, 339 (6th Cir. 1997); Hughes v. Boston Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 264, 268 (1st Cir. 1994); Pitcher v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 870 F. Supp. 903
(S.D. Ind. 1994), affd, 93 F.3d 407 (7th Cir. 1996).
257 Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) ("If a benefit plan gives
discretion to an administrator or fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of interest, that conflict
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flurry of litigation, deciding on how best to adjust or modify the abuse of
discretion standard in conflict of interest contexts. As a result, the circuits are
divided as to the application of the abuse of discretion standard in conflict of
interest contexts.258
Immediately after Firestone, the Eleventh Circuit decided upon a
"presumptively void" (or burden shifting) standard to be used in conflict of
interest cases.
Under such a standard, if the claimant proves a "substantial"
conflict of interest or the existence of an inherent conflict of interest, the burden
shifts to the plan administrator to justify to the court that its decision was not
tainted by self-interest. 26 0 The Eleventh Circuit justified such standard as
"prophylactic," since it would discourage conflict of interest arrangements.26 1
Given the level of litigation involving conflict of interests, such has not been the
case. The Ninth Circuit has also adopted this prophylactic theory, relying on
trust law, holding that any self-interest action by a trustee as presumptively
void.262
Many circuits simply reformulate the abuse of discretion standard by means
of a "sliding scale" approach in the presence of a conflict of interest. 263 Such a
must be weighed as a factor in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion." (internal
Tuotations omitted)).
See Doyle v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 144 F.3d 181, 183-84 (1st Cir. 1998); Mers v. Marriott
Int'l Group Accidental Death & Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d 1014, 1019-20 (7th Cir. 1998);
Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace & Def. Co., 82 F.3d 1251 (2d Cir. 1996); Pitman v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 24 F.3d 118, 121 (10th Cir. 1994); Sweatman v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 39 F.3d 594,
597-98 (5th Cir. 1994); Bernards v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 987 F.2d 486, 488 (8th Cir.
1993); Doe v. Group Hospitalization & Med. Servs., 3 F.3d 80, 85 (4th Cir. 1993); Taft v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 9 F.3d 1469, 1474 (9th Cir. 1993); Kotrosits v. GATX Corp. NonContributory Pension Plan for Salaried Employees, 970 F.2d 1165, 1173 (3d Cir. 1992); Miller v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 925 F.2d 979, 983 (6th Cir. 1991); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc.,
898 F.2d 1556, 1562 (11 th Cir. 1990); Wilson v. Group Hospitalization & Med. Servs., Inc., 791 F.
Supp. 309, 312 (D.D.C. 1992).
259 See Brown, 898 F.2d at 1566. The majority of other circuits reject the Brown presumptively
void theory. See Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 391-92 (3d Cir. 2000);
Doyle, 144 F.3d at 184; Vega v. Nat'l Life Ins. Servs., Inc., 188 F.3d 287, 296-97 (5th Cir. 1999);
Mers, 144 F.3d at 1019-20; Chambers v. Family Health Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818, 826 (10th Cir.
1996); Sullivan, 82 F.3d at 1255.
260 See Brown, 898 F.2d at 1565-66 (requiring the beneficiary to show that the fiduciary placed
himself/herself in a conflict of interest position, thereby shifting the burden to the fiduciary to show
that his/her discretion was not tainted by self-interest).
261 Id. at 1565 (indicating that "one reason for limiting the deference when the fiduciary suffers a
conflict of interest is to discourage arrangements where a conflict arises").
262 See Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317, 1323 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing GEORGE T.
BOGERT, TRUSTS § 95 (6th ed. 1987) for the proposition that "under the common law of trusts, any
action taken by a trustee in violation of a fiduciary obligation is presumptively void"); Lee v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 10 F.3d 1547, 1552 (11th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the insurer's claim that it does
not operate under a conflict of interest as it is a non-profit state-regulated entity, thereby shifting
the burden to the insurer to prove its interpretation was not tainted by self-interest).
263 See Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 384-85 (3d Cir. 2000) (adopting a
sliding scale approach); Vega v. Nat'l Life Ins. Servs., 188 F.3d 287, 296 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting
that the court will not as deferentially in a conflict of interest situation); Borda v. Hardy, Lewis,
Pollard & Page, P.C., 138 F.3d 1062, 1069 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that arbitrary and capricious
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standard is then regarded as flexible, affording less deference in order to
neutralize the degree of the conflict.264 As the standard is one that must be
adjusted by the courts, the claimant will have an additional chance to challenge
the plan administrator's decision if a conflict of interest can be alleged or proven.
Therefore, employer self-funded plans that are also self-administered by the
employer, and insured plans where the insurer is the plan administrator, present
conflict of interest situations where the plan administrator's decisions may not be
afforded full deference.
The recent patients' bill of rights is silent on the ERISA judicial standard of
review, but negates the conflict of interest potential for health claim denials since
the claimant would be given the right to independent medical review. Likewise,
the impending DOL regulations are silent on the ERISA judicial standard of
review, but assure the claimant of greater neutrality because the second stage of
benefit review must be made de novo and by a second fiduciary, who is different
than the fiduciary who made the initial determination. 65
Despite the regulations attempt to negate the exhaustion of administrative
remedies doctrine, unless the regulations are strictly complied with, the courts
will have to modify their judicial standard of review since there may be no
decision to review nor an administrative record or evidence to examine.
Litigation will obviously grow alongside the courts' calendars as courts conduct
de novo review of benefit determinations.

standard is "shaped by the circumstances of the inherent conflict of interest" (internal quotations
omitted)); Doyle v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 144 F.3d 181, 184 (1st Cir. 1998) (adopting the
language from Doe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 971 F. Supp. 623, 630 (D. Mass. 1997)); McGraw v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 137 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 1998) (using a less deferential standard
in a conflict of interest context); Snow v. Standard Ins. Co., 87 F.3d 327, 331 (9th Cir. 1996),
overruled on other grounds by Kearney v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 1998); Woo v.
Deluxe Corp., 144 F.3d 1157, 1160-61 (8th Cir. 1998) (requiring plaintiff to prove a conflict of
interest that interfered with the administrator's decision in order to obtain a less deferential standard
of review); Chojnacki v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 108 F.3d 810, 814-15 (7th Cir. 1997) (reshaping
the arbitrary and capricious standard in the context of a conflict of interest, giving less deference
the more serious the conflict becomes); Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace & Def. Co., 82 F.3d 1251, 1255
(2d Cir. 1996) (reviewing the decision de novo once a conflict of interest has been identified);
Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1562 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that an
inherent conflict of interest renders the use of a highly deferential standard inappropriate), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991).
264 See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 379 (holding that the sliding scale standard calls for more intense scrutiny
to match the degree of conflict); Vega, 188 F.3d at 288 (applying less deference to offset the
influence, to be determined on a case by case basis); McGraw v. Prudential Ins. Co., 137 F.3d
1253, 1259 (10th Cir. 1998) (adjusting the sliding scale in proportion to the degree of conflict
present); Mers v. Marriott Int'l Group Accidental Death And Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d 1014,
1019-20 (7th Cir. 1998) (describing the arbitrary and capricious standard as not an "all or nothing"
choice between full or no deference), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 947 (1998); Woo, 144 F.3d at 1161-62
(referring to the sliding scale as a flexible standard).
265 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h)(3)(ii) (2000).

HeinOnline -- 70 UMKC L. Rev. 379 2001-2002

UMKC L4WREVIEW

[Vol.70:2

J. Evidentiary Issues at the Time of Adjudication
Another civil procedure issue that arises in benefit denial cases is whether the
court is limited to the evidence that was presented before the plan administrator
during the review process. The claimant would obviously prefer to offer
additional evidence, which was either ignored or discovered after the review
process, for the courts to review. The courts have determined that the resolution
of this issue depends on the applicable judicial standard of review to be applied
in the given case. In cases where the arbitrary and capricious standard is
applicable, virtually all the circuits limit the evidence presented at court to that
contained in the administrative record. 266 If the trial court believes the plan
administrator lacked sufficient evidence to make a benefits' decision, the proper
recourse is to remand the issue to the plan administrator for redetermination.2 67
Such result is consistent with the requirement of the exhaustion of administrative
remedies doctrine applied by the courts because an administrative record is
assembled for review.
See Elliot v. Sara Lee Corp., 190 F.3d 601, 608 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that "an assessment of
the reasonableness of the administrator's decision must be based on the facts known to it at the
time" (internal quotations omitted)); Perlman v. Swiss Bank Corp. Comprehensive Disability Prot.
Plan, 195 F.3d 975, 981-82 (7th Cir. 1999) (concluding that it would be error for the lower courts to
permit discovery into the plan administrator's decision); Heller v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 142 F.3d
487, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (refusing to consider evidence that was unavailable at the time of the
administrator's initial determination); Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 113 F.3d 433, 440 (3d Cir.
1997) (limiting its review of the "whole" record to that of the evidence before the administrator);
Miller v. United Welfare Fund, 72 F.3d 1066, 1071 (2d Cir. 1995) (rejecting the use of evidence
other than the administrative record); Lee v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 10 F.3d 1547, 1550 (1 1th
Cir. 1994) (limiting the courts to the facts known to the administrator at the time the decision was
made); Taft v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 9 F.3d 1469, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding it
inappropriate for the district court to examine evidence apart from the administrative record);
Wildbur v. ARCO Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 639 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting the Fifth Circuit's longstanding finding that the administrator's findings of fact findings are limited to the evidence before
the administrator, citing Denton v. First Nat'l Bank of Waco, 765 F.2d 1295, 1304 (5th Cir. 1985)
and Lowry v. Bankers Life & Casualty Ret. Plan, 865 F.2d 692, 694 (5th Cir. 1989)); Sandoval v.
Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 377, 381 (10th Cir. 1992) (admonishing the lower courts to
adhere to the general rule of limiting review based on the administrative record); Oldenburger v.
Cent. States, SE & SW Areas Teamster Pension Fund, 934 F.2d 171, 174 (8th Cir. 1991) (limiting
review to the evidence before the trustees when the final decision was made); Perry v. Simplicity
Eng., 900 F.2d 963, 966-67 (6th Cir. 1990) (dictating a strict limitation to consider only the
information considered by the plan administrator). But cf Doe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 53,
57 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that the record to be considered by the court "may depend on what has
been decided, by whom, based on what kind of information, and also on the standard of review and
the relief sought," thereby permitting limited discovery of extra-record evidence); Tremain v. Bell
Indus., 196 F.3d 970, 976-77 (9th Cir. 1999) (permitting extra-record evidence in determining
whether the administrator was operating under a conflict of interest); Booton v. Lockheed Med.
Benefit Plan, 110 F.3d 1461, 1464 (9th Cir. 1997) (permitting extra-record evidence in
extraordinary cases where the plan administrator ignored relevant information); Lee, 10 F.3d at
1552 (permitting additional evidence to rebut the administrator's bias in a conflict of interest
context); Bernards v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 987 F.2d 486, 489 (8th Cir. 1993) (per
curiam) (deviating from its general rule of staying discovery in appropriate "emergency" cases in
which irreparable harm may occur); Moon v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86, 89 (11 th Cir.
266
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If the de novo standard of review is applicable, many circuits are receptive to
granting discretion to the lower courts to consider evidence outside that of the
administrative record as needed to make a determination. 269 The Fourth and the
Sixth Circuits take a different approach. The Sixth Circuit refuses to admit
additional evidence at trial, reasoning that the courts are not to serve as substitute
plan administrators and to do so would only detract from ERISA's goal of an
expedited claims process. 270 However, if no administrative record exists and the
court's only recourse is to remand the issue for redetermination by the plan
administrator, the end result for the claimant is a never-ending cycle of benefit
redeterminations with no resolution. The Fourth Circuit is somewhere in the
middle, permitting271discretion to the lower court but only if necessary to resolve
the benefit claim.
In Quesinberry v. Life Insurance Co. of North America, the
1989) (permitting additional facts unavailable to the plan administrator to be submitted under the de
novo standard of review).
267 See Elliott, 190 F.3d at 609 (directing the remand to the trustees for a new determination in lieu
of additional evidence submitted at the district courts, but citing Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761
F.2d 1003, 1008 (4th Cir. 1985), for the proposition that "remand should be used sparingly");
Killian v. Healthsource Provident Adm'rs, Inc., 152 F.3d 514, 522 (6th Cir. 1998) (remanding to
consider additional evidence as the administrative record was inadequate); Recupero v. New
England Tel. & Tel. Co., 118 F.3d 820, 822 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that ordinarily the appropriate
form of order is to remand to the out-of-court decisionmaker); Miller, 72 F.3d at 1071 (instructing
the district court to remand to the trustees to consider additional evidence "unless no new evidence
could produce a reasonable conclusion permitting denial of the claim or remand would otherwise
be a useless formality"); Jett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 890 F.2d 1137, 1139 (11th Cir.
1989) (instructing the district court to remand as it had not limited itself to the administrative
record).
268 See Brown v. Seitz Foods, Inc. Disability Benefit Plan, 140 F.3d 1198, 1201 (8th Cir. 1998)
(affirming that the plaintiffs effort to provide additional evidence outside the administrative record
was "nothing more than a last-gasp attempt to quarrel with [the plan administrator's]
determination" (quoting Davidson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 953 F.2d 1093, 1095 (8th Cir.
1992))).
269 Several circuits permit district courts the discretion to consider outside evidence. See Recupero,
118 F.3d at 834 (allowing a range of discretion in admitting evidence suitable for judicial review);
DeFelice v. Am. Int'l Life Assurance Co., 112 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir. 1997) (granting the district
court discretion if it finds "good cause to consider additional evidence"); Casey v. Uddeholm
Corp., 32 F.3d 1094, 1099 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that de novo review is the correct standard for a
bench trial, but not for a summary judgment); Kirwan v. Marriott Corp., 10 F.3d 784, 789-90 (11th
Cir. 1994) (holding that administrators' decisions should be reviewed de novo); Donatelli v. Home
Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 763, 765 (8th Cir. 1993); Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare & Pension Trust
Funds, 944 F.2d 1176, 1185 (3d Cir. 1991) (granting discretion to the district court to supplement
the record when making its own independent benefit determinations); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1571 (11th Cir. 1990). Cf. Davidson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 953 F.2d
1093 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding where evidence was known or should have been known during
administrative proceedings, the record may not be re-opened to allow submission of the evidence).
270 See Wulf v. Quantum Chem. Corp., 26 F.3d 1368, 1376 (6th Cir.) (noting that circuit's
departure from the majority view), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1058 (1994); Perry v. Simplicity Eng.,
900 F.2d 963, 967 (6th Cir. 1990) (limiting review of evidence in ERISA contexts to that presented
to administrator).
271 See Bernstein v. Capitalcare, Inc., 70 F.3d 783, 790 (4th Cir. 1995) (allowing additional
evidence where record was deficient on medical evidence); Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co., 987 F.2d
1017, 1026-27 (4th Cir. 1993) (permitting discretion as necessary due to the wide variety of
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Fourth Circuit noted that an automatic rule requiring the scope of evidentiary
review was inappropriate.27 2 Given that the trial court would be presented with
such a wide variety of ERISA claim cases - cases involving plans with extensive
administrative procedure and lengthy records to cases involving plans with
limited administrative procedures and meager records; cases involving a conflict
of interest where the plan administrator and payor are the same entity; cases
involving complex medical issues and interpretation of plan terms - a more
flexible approach to the scope of evidentiary review made more sense.273
While the patients' bill of rights does not specifically address these
evidentiary issues, many of the problems confronting claimants on this issue will
be resolved since a sharing of information with the claimant and with the
independent review determiner is required, thus eliminating the need for the
courts to worry whether all the evidence was considered.
Similarly, the
impending DOL regulations do not specifically address the evidentiary issues at
trial since significant disclosure of materials considered at the various levels of
the review process will be required, including disclosure of internal rules,
guidelines, and protocols relied upon in making the adverse benefit
determination.2 75

K. Jury Trials
As is true with many of ERISA's procedural rules, ERISA is silent on the
issue of whether any of the causes of action permit trial by jury. However,
federal courts have routinely denied jury trials to ERISA claimants denied
benefits, because such claims are viewed as equitable in nature. 276 The Supreme
Court has affirmed this conclusion with the Firestone decision, ruling that trust
law governed benefit claims determinations, 277 and the Mertens decision, limiting
administrative records presented to the district courts, but noting that in most cases, additional
evidence would not be necessary for the court's review). Cf Mongeluzo v. Baxter Travenol Long
Term Disability Benefit Plan, 46 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 1995) (permitting additional evidence "to
enable the full exercise of informed and independent judgement"); Donatelli v. Home Ins. Co., 992
F.2d 763, 765 (8th Cir. 1993) (requiring good cause in order to permit outside evidence).
272 987 F.2d at 1025-27.
273 Id. at 1025-26.
274 See Bipartisan Patient Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 2563, 107th Cong. (2001); Bipartisan
Patient Protection Act of 2001, S. 1052, 107th Cong. (2001); see also supra text accompanying
note 62.
275 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (2001).
276 Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace & Def. Co., 82 F.3d 1251, 1258-59 (2d Cir. 1996); Cox v. Keystone
Carbon Co., 894 F.2d 647, 649-50 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811 (1990); Daniel v.
Eaton Corp., 839 F.2d 263, 268 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 826 (1988); Nevill v. Shell
Oil Co., 835 F.2d 209, 213 (9th Cir. 1987); Howard v. Parisian, Inc., 807 F.2d 1560, 1566-67 (11th
Cir. 1987); Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1006-07 (4th Cir. 1985); Blau v. Del Monte
Corp., 748 F.2d 1348, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985); In re Vorpahl, 695
F.2d 318, 321 (8th Cir. 1982); Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir. 1980); Wardle v.
Cent. States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 829 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1112 (1981).
277 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989) (affirming
the "principles of
trust law" in detennining the appropriate judicial standard of review in benefit denial cases).
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relief under ERISA section 502(a)(3) relief to traditional equitable remedies.2 78
However, in the context of benefit claims under the Taft-Hartley Act, as well as
ERISA, the right to jury trial has been permitted. 279 Similarly, the right to trial by
jury is present if the claim arises under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.*80
The proposed patients' bill of rights and the impending DOL regulations are
all silent on the issue of jury trial for benefit denial claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
Due to ERISA's silence on a number of significant procedural issues, the
courts have fashioned a federal common law in a variety of areas. In the context
of causes for benefit claims, most courts implicitly presume that the plan sponsor
will conform with the requirements of ERISA and, thus, deal fairly with the
participant. However, due to the courts' application of eleven specific ERISA
procedural rules, a plaintiff's rights are not protected, and any analysis of such
rights is anything but straightforward. The courts seem torn between (1)
ERISA's legislative intent to protect participants' and beneficiaries' substantive
rights under ERISA, with access to courts if necessary; and (2) the voluntary
nature of employee benefit plans, delivered by the employer as settlor of the plan.
ERISA recognizes that the employer sponsor, not the government, defines the
type and level of benefits provided under these plans. Congress' intent is to
assure that rules of fairness govern in the delivery of these voluntary benefits.
In the arena of pension benefits, Congress has increasingly imposed
restrictions on defined benefit plans to protect and strengthen participants' and
beneficiaries' rights since the enactment of ERISA; the result, unfortunately, has
led to the demise of many defined benefit pension plans in favor of defined
contribution plans. 28 The employers rationalize that if a fixed amount of payroll
278

Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 257-58 (1993) (limiting the scope of relief for ERISA

section 502(a)(3) cases to the type of equitable relief traditionally afforded by the common law
court of equity).
279 See Stewart v. KHD Deutz of Am. Corp., 75 F.3d 1522, 1526 (11th Cir. 1996) (characterizing a
LMRA section 301 cause of action as a breach of contract claim, which is a legal cause of action)
(affirming the right to jury trial on a legal claim for breach of contract pursuant to LMRA section
301), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 930 (1996); Senn v. United Dominion Indus., 951 F.2d 806, 814 (7th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 903 (1993); Dennis v. Sawbrook Steel Castings Co., 792 F. Supp.
552, 560 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (affirming the right to a jury trial for LMRA section 301 claims as they
are akin to breach of contract actions); Smith v. ABS Indus., 653 F. Supp. 94, 98 (N.D. Ohio 1986)
(affirming LMRA section 301 claims as traditional breach of contract claims which are triable by
jury trial); Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 114 F.R.D. 587, 597-98 (E.D. Wash. 1986) (agreeing that
LMRA section 301 claims are traditionally legal and thus should be afforded ajury trial).
280 See Dasler v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 694 F. Supp. 624, 627 (D. Minn. 1988) (noting that a lOb-5
claim under the Securities and Exchange Act was presented to the jury as finder of fact).
281 For defined benefit pension plans in the United States, K.M. Ostaszewski notes three possible
reasons for the demise: (1) "change in the relationship between employer and employees;" (2) "new
tax laws and funding regulations;" and (3) "distribution of risk between employer and employee;"
but places concluding emphasis on a fourth possible reason - a correlated "shift away from
compensating labor in the form of wages." Krzysztof M. Ostaszewski, MacroeconomicAspects of
Private Retirement Programs, 5 N.A. ACTUARIAL J. 3, 53-54 (July 2001). By contrast, for defined
benefit pension plans in Canada, R.L. Brown and J. Liu show that the aforementioned fourth reason
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is desired to be attributed to retirement benefits, but a significantly greater
percentage of payroll becomes needed for the expense and maintenance of
defined benefit plans than for defined contributions, then the employers will shift
to defined contribution plans to forestall an increase in the percentage of payroll
actually used for paying and administering employees' benefits.
As health and disability benefits have been historically akin to defined
benefits (i.e., the plan defines the benefits covered, as opposed to the benefits
being defined by the level of contribution made to the plan), a growing concern is
that continued regulation of such benefits will result in a major shift from a
defined benefit approach to supplying these benefits to a defined contribution
approach. Such concern arises sharply from the recent proposed legislation
relating to patients' bill of rights which seeks not only to mandate certain health
coverage for emergency care and clinical trials by employers, but to further
strengthen the enforcement of benefits voluntarily provided by employers
through employee benefit plans. While the various patients' bills of rights have
been subject to great debate due to expected increase in expenses for employer
health plans, practitioners predict that the mandatedcoverage provisions may be
even more expensive than the liability provisions.
For employers with only a
fixed percentage of payroll to use for employee benefit plans and for small
employers operating on a thin profit margin, the end result may be greater
protections for participants' benefits, but an ever-shrinking level of benefits
being provided via the employer. This paradoxical result might be considered, as
a matter of public policy, to be the proverbial Pyrrhic Victory.

"does not fit the Canadian experience well." Robert L. Brown & Jianxum Liu, The Shift to Defined
Contribution Pension Plans: Why Did it Not Happen in Canada?, 5 N.A. ACTUARIAL J. 3, 65 (July
2001). They conclude that "the difference in pension regulation and taxation in Canada and the
United States has directly influenced plan sponsors in considering their pension objectives, costs,
and risks." Id. at 76.
282See comments made by attorneys at the American Bar Association's annual meeting, as
recorded by BNA, Inc. e-mail update at http://subscript.bna.com (August 9, 2001).
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